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 Article 
Information Disclosure, Risk Trading and the 
Nature of Derivative Instruments: From 
Common Law Perspective 
Chao-Hung Christophe Chen* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores issues of pre-contractual disclosure for derivative 
instruments, of which this paper describes as contracts to trade risks, in the UK and 
US. While there is no general duty of disclosure in common law, this paper focuses 
on whether there should be a duty of disclosure for derivative instruments by 
comparing with securities law and insurance law. This paper argues that mandatory 
disclosure in the securities market cannot be extended to exchange-traded futures 
contracts (save where securities are involved) because of the nature of securities. In 
addition, this paper argues that derivative instruments, though similar to insurance 
in certain regards, lack the inequality of knowledge issue underlying contracts of 
insurance; and thus, derivative instruments should not be seen as another type of 
contract uberrimae fidei. However, while we cannot establish a duty of disclosure by 
treating derivative instruments like securities or insurance, we argue that the 
concepts of market abuse and insider dealing might provide a better basis for 
addressing information issues in the risk trading market. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, we will treat derivative instruments1 as contracts to trade 
risks,2,3 and we will turn to a fundamental problem of risk trading — 
information and uncertainty. Risk trading relies heavily on information and 
there is a range of disclosure and non-disclosure rules in different legal 
fields. The insider dealing rule also provides another angle from which to 
approach potential information problems in risk trading. In light of certain 
disclosure rules in laws relating to securities and insurance, we might further 
inquire whether derivative instruments are another type of contract 
uberrimae fidei or whether the disclosure rule attaching to securities could 
be extended to apply to derivative transactions. From this perspective, the 
information problem might influence the nature of derivative instruments 
and might raise further regulatory issues. We will argue that neither the 
securities nor insurance disclosure rules are completely suitable for the 
derivatives market. It is arguable whether we need to create a special rule for 
risk trading contracts and an analysis of market manipulation might provide 
a better basis for accessing potential information problems in the risk trading 
market. The following discussion is largely based on UK Law, but certain 
US materials will be added for comparison. 
While this paper focuses on the distinction of relevant concepts under 
UK law and US law, this research will also benefit readers with Taiwan law 
background. The arguments developed in this paper might also be applied to 
                                                                                                                            
 1. In general, a derivative “can be defined as a financial instrument whose values depend on (or 
derive from) the values of other, more basic underlying variables.” In general, a derivative “can be 
defined as a financial instrument whose values depend on (or derive from) the values of other, more 
basic underlying variables.” SATYAJIT DAS, DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS & PRICING 4 (3d ed. rev. ed. 
2006). The umbrella term of “derivative” may refer to a wide range of financial products traded in 
different forms and based on a variety of underlying assets. The four general categories of derivatives 
include options, futures, forward contracts, and swap agreements. There are so-called hybrid (or 
structured) instruments that incorporate certain derivative techniques into a traditional instrument 
(such as bonds). Looking at the place where derivative instruments are traded, those traded on 
organised exchanges may be differentiated from those traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. 
 To put in short, options are rights (but not obligations) to buy or sell something in the future at a 
price fixed at present. In a forward contract, the buyer agrees to buy and the seller agrees to sell a 
specified underlying asset on a specified date at a specified price (the “forward price”). DAS, at 9. 
Futures contracts are forward contracts that are traded on a futures exchange. A swap is in essence an 
exchange of cash flows; thus, in a way a swap could be seen as a composition of forward contracts. 
DAS, at 83. As there are many types of derivative instruments in the market, this paper cannot explain 
all of them in full, but this paper will explain how a certain product operates where necessary. 
 2. This description is based on the two major functions of derivative instruments: hedging and 
speculation. On the one hand, derivative instruments help market participants to hedge against risk 
exposure. On the other, they also allow traders to speculate on future uncertainties. 
 3. In general, risk is “the chancing of negativity — of some loss or harm. … Risk faces us with 
the possibility that something untoward may occur, while leaving us unable to foretell any specific 
outcome with categorical assurance.” NICHOLAS RESCHER, RISK: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO THE THEORY OF RISK EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT 1 (1983). See also Anthony Giddens, Risk 
and Responsibility, 62 M.L.R. 1 (1999). 
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relevant laws and concepts in Taiwan. In addition, while the UK and the US 
boast the biggest derivatives market in the world, and many Taiwanese 
financial institutions have to conduct derivative transactions with British or 
American financial institutions, or have their agreements governed by 
English law or New York law. Thus, having understanding of the 
development and applicable laws in the UK and the US would be helpful to 
practitioners and academic researchers who have interests in derivative 
instruments.  
 
II. INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN RISK TRADING  
 
A. Information and Trading 
 
Information problems can best be illustrated by an old American case, 
Laidlaw v. Organ4 a case about a tobacco sale in New Orleans in the early 
19th century. During that time, New Orleans was under blockade by the 
British Navy during the war of 1812 and the price of tobacco would have 
been higher had the blockade been lifted. When the Treaty of Ghent was 
signed and the news spread through Britain and Washington, people in New 
Orleans were still ignorant of this fact. Before the news reached other traders 
in New Orleans, the defendant-buyer somehow learnt the news from another 
person who was with the British fleet at the time. The buyer then entered 
into a sale agreement with the claimant and some tobacco was delivered. 
Soon after, news of the peace treaty was circulated and the claimant-seller 
felt he had been cheated, so he brought a lawsuit to stop the buyer from 
disposing of the tobacco that had been delivered and refused to make 
delivery of the rest. The issue was whether the buyer should have disclosed 
this important information to the seller and whether, upon inquiry by the 
seller, the buyer could keep silent on the issue. Unfortunately for Laidlaw, 
the US Supreme Court refused to impose a duty of disclosure on Organ. 
Although Laidlaw was in the context of a physical sale, the same 
scenario could appear in derivatives trading. Had the contract between 
Laidlaw and Organ required delivery of tobacco three months after the 
conclusion of the contract, it would have become an information problem for 
a forward contract. On the other hand, gambling could shed some light on 
the speculative aspect of risk trading contracts, for if both parties in Laidlaw 
had wagered on the level of tobacco prices in the following month instead of 
concluding an immediate physical sale, the withholding of information by 
Mr. Organ might have constituted fraud or cheating. 
                                                                                                                            
 4. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817). 
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Since trading risk deals with future uncertainties,5 proper evaluation of 
the risk exposure relies heavily on all sorts of information. Possible impact 
from future risk can be better accessed if one has better knowledge and 
information. However, since acquiring and distributing information incurs 
costs and since the information itself might be valuable enough to prohibit it 
from being free flowing, there could be an information gap between 
someone who holds the information and someone else who has not been 
informed. In Laidlaw, Laidlaw did not learn the news of the Ghent Treaty 
because it took time for this information to arrive in New Orleans.6 A lack 
of information of this kind could create problems before or after a contract is 
made. With the help of modern telecommunication, the Internet, and the 
multi-media, situations similar to Laidlaw are less likely to occur again 
because information can be transmitted around the world much more quickly 
and at a lower cost than in 1812. However, even a few minutes difference 
might be enough to earn a fortune for a trader.7 Information dissemination is 
still an issue that has to be considered, especially when we consider the fact 
that not every trader possesses equal tools and expertise in the risk trading 
market. 
Laidlaw is a typical example of a pre-contractual disclosure issue. If 
non-disclosure pertains after the conclusion of a contract, it might become a 
so-called “moral hazard” problem. In this paper, we will focus on 
information issues in a pre-contractual context. Against this backdrop, we 
might find that information creates problems in various ways. For example, 
the following situations might happen: 
(1) one party provides false information to the other party with regard to 
a fact; 
(2) one party makes his prediction and this prediction turns out to be 
inaccurate; 
(3) one party conceals some information from the other party when the 
                                                                                                                            
 5. We should be aware that some commentators distinguish “risk” further from “uncertainty” on 
the ground that the probability of a risk is known (though whether it will actually occur remains 
unknown), while the probability of an uncertainty remains unknown. See Desmond Eppel, Risky 
Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 40 COLUM. J. TRASNNAT’L L. 677, 687 (2000); see 
also Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market 
for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 743 (1999). 
 6. Another interesting story is how a banker called Nathan Rothschild earned huge profits by 
having advance information about the outcome of the Battle of Waterloo before other traders learnt the 
news. Rich Karlgaard, Winning — It’s All About Information, FORBES, available at http://www.forbes. 
com/2005/10/20/karlgaard-rich-information_comm05_cz_rk_1024karlgaard.html (last visited Oct. 24, 
2005). See also EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE 122 
(2005). 
 7. Dan Morgan has depicted how a trader picked up the most up-to-date news from all around the 
world, including listening to the English version of Radio Moscow in the hope of getting a tip about 
Russian grain, and how a trader recovered a loss by delaying publishing news regarding a new big 
transaction. DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 282-86 (1980). 
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other makes an inquiry; 
(4) a person is not asked for key information by the other party, and 
chooses not to disclose (or hides) it;  
(5) one party is either the generator of a price-influencing event or a 
close insider to that event.In this paper, we will focus on what 
Professor Treitel has called “‘pure’ non-disclosure.”8 In principle, 
then, we will deal with issues (3) to (5) rather than going into detail 
over cases of deceit or misrepresentation except where relevant. 
It should be noted that the importance of information is not exclusive to 
risk trading contracts but is relevant to all kinds of transactions. Information 
is crucial in ascertaining the real value of a property (e.g. the health of pigs 
on sale9 or the unknown quality of a stone10). Information is also important 
for service or employment contracts (e.g. a criminal record in the case of a 
security guard). There is no doubt that the law regarding fraud, 
misrepresentation and mistake plays a role in shaping the relationship 
between parties. We recognise that information is essential for risk trading, 
but this does not necessarily mean that risk trading requires a different 
disclosure rule from other commercial contracts. Thus, in this paper, we will 
first discuss the current common law rules with regard to pre-contractual 
information disclosure and the limits of the laws regarding deceit and 
misrepresentation, and we will further examine some special categories 
where there is a duty of disclosure that may be applied to risk trading 
contracts. 
 
B. Current Laws on Pre-contractual Disclosure 
 
If one party’s lack of information causes some problems, forcing the 
other party to disclose the information (by avoiding the contract, providing 
compensation or using other remedies) seems to be the most direct way to 
address the issue. However, in general, there is no pre-contractual duty of 
disclosure in common law.11 “Let the buyer beware” (caveat emptor) is thus 
the general principle. 
On the other hand, there also exist several exceptions to the general 
non-disclosure rule. The first exception is the so-called contract of utmost 
good faith (contract uberrimae fidei), of which insurance is the most typical 
                                                                                                                            
 8 . Professor Treitel uses the term “pure non-disclosure” to describe the situation where 
non-disclosure does not give rise to misrepresentation, negligence, or deceit. GUENTER TREITEL, THE 
LAW OF CONTRACT 436 (2007). 
 9. Ward v. Hobbs, (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 150 (C.A.). 
 10. Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42 (Wis. 1885). 
 11. In Keates v. Cadogan, it was held that the landlord did not have to disclose the condition of 
the flat to potential tenants. Keates v. Cadogan, (1851) 10 C.B. 591. See also Bell v. Lever Brother, 
Ltd., [1932] AC 161 (H.L.) (per Lord Atkin); Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817). 
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example.12 To observe the utmost good faith “the assured must disclose to 
the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance 
which is known to the assured.”13 If the assured fails to disclose, the insurer 
could avoid the contract.14 
Secondly, a person might have to disclose information if he has a special 
relationship with the counterparty. Where there is a relationship of trust 
between parties, there may be a duty of disclosure; for example, 
pre-contractual disclosure might be required to a certain degree for a 
partnership agreement15 or a contract to marry or separate.16 A stronger 
form of trust and confidence would create what we call a fiduciary 
relationship. However, we should be aware that a fiduciary duty does not 
automatically imply a duty of disclosure. We have to carefully analyse the 
extent of fiduciary duty in different contexts before concluding whether a 
party has to disclose certain information before a contract is made. 
Thirdly, disclosure is frequently required by statute. For example, a 
company wishing to list its shares on a stock exchange has to disclose certain 
information to investors in the listing particulars or prospectus.17 We should 
be aware that while the Financial Services Authority (FSA) imposes a duty 
on issuers of financial instruments traded on regulated markets (i.e. 
exchanges) to disclose inside information,18 this duty of disclosure is not 
extended to all traders on the financial market (notably OTC derivative 
traders). We will have further discussion of insider dealing later. 
Fourthly, the need to disclose information may derive from tort law. A 
person might have to disclose to avoid fraud or misrepresentation, 
particularly when there is a continuous representation.19 It is not surprising 
that several non-disclosure cases refer to “fraud.”20 Arguably, a person 
might have to disclose certain information to avoid liability under the tort of 
negligence if a duty of care is established. However, we should note that 
                                                                                                                            
 12. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw 7, c. 41, § 17 (Eng.). 
 13. Id. § 18. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Conlon v. Simms, [2006] 2 All E.R. 1024 (Ch.). 
 16. LAW RELATING TO ACTIONABLE NON-DISCLOSURE §§ 1.05, 10.01 & 11.01 (George Spencer 
Bower, Richard John Sutton & Alexander Kingcome Turner eds., 1990). 
 17. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 80 (hereinafter FSMA 2000). 
 18. See FSA Handbook, DTR 2. For its text, availavle at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/ 
handbook/DTR (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 
 19. The definition of “fraud” or deceit could be found in Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337, 
374 (H.L.) (per Lord Herschell). For continuous misrepresentation, see With v. O’Flanagan, [1936] 
Ch. 575 (C.A.); Spice Girls Ltd. v. Aprilia World Services BV, [2002] EWCA Civ. 15. See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979). Cf. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
2005/29/EC, Articles 6 & 7. For its text, availavle at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:149:0022:0039:EN:PDF (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). 
 20. For example, Lord Mansfield’s remarks on insurance disclosure, see infra notes 63 & 64; and 
Mr. Justice Blackburn’s analysis on insider dealing, see infra note 132. 
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liability in tort law does not necessarily mean a duty to disclose to the 
counterparty. In addition, a person must avoid misrepresentation, but this 
would not be translated into a duty to disclose unless the non-disclosure 
itself is deemed a misrepresentation. 
In principle, one is not liable for one’s silence unless such silence might 
establish fraud or misrepresentation.21 Thus, one might escape liability if 
one merely chooses not to disclose information to the other party rather than 
disclosing wrong information, which increases the difficulty of using the 
concepts of deceit or misrepresentation to deal with the situation in Laidlaw. 
Things could become more complicated if the other party inquires about 
knowledge on a certain matter and the first party does not answer properly. 
We should note that other aspects of private law have evolved to address 
some of the issues regarding silence. For example, product liability and 
product safety regulations also force a manufacturer to disclose certain 
information to consumers.22 
It is important to note that there is a limited class of duty of disclosure in 
New York. Under New York law:  
 
In business negotiations, an affirmative duty to disclose material 
information may arise from the need to complete or clarify one 
party’s partial or ambiguous statement … or from a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship between the parties… Such a duty may 
also arise … where: (1) one party has superior knowledge of certain 
information; (2) that information is not readily available to the other 
party; and (3) the first party knows that the second party is acting 
on the basis of mistaken knowledge.23 
 
This duty of disclosure has often arisen in the context of fraud and 
misrepresentation.24 
In short, what could be perceived as “fraud” by the general public might 
not translate directly into the tort of deceit or misrepresentation. The tort of 
deceit and the law of misrepresentation could well apply where one makes a 
                                                                                                                            
 21. Blackburn J states that “a mere abstinence from disabusing the purchaser of that [mistaken] 
impression is not fraud or deceit.” Smith v. Hughes, (1871) 6 Q.B. 597, 607 (H.L.). See also Ward v. 
Hobbs, (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 150 (C.A.); With v. O’Flanagan, [1936] Ch. 575 (C.A.); HIH Casualty and 
General Insurance Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, [2001] 2 LLOYD’S REP. 483, 494 (C.A.) (per Rix 
LJ). 
 22. Consumer Protection Act, 1987, c. 43, §§ 2 & 11 (Eng.). 
 23. Banque Arabe et Internationale d’Investissement v. Maryland National Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 
155 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Young v. Keith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). We should also 
notice that some American courts did impose a duty to disclose defects of a house if the seller knows 
of a defect that would materially affect the value of the house. See Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Soloman v. Birger, 477 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985). 
 24. In both Banque Arabe, id., and Young, id., this duty was discussed in the context of fraud. 
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wrong statement with regard to a fact; likewise, spreading false information 
in the financial market is usually prohibited.25 However, their application is 
limited where a statement is merely an opinion and might not be “false” in 
the strict sense. The broader meaning of “fraud” might be more of rhetorical 
than of any real use. We have to recognise the limited scope of the common 
law remedies for deceit and misrepresentation with respect to information 
problems, particularly when they involve pure non-disclosure of certain 
information. 
 
C. Theories of Disclosure or Non-Disclosure  
 
It is difficult to provide a comprehensive theory that incorporates all the 
disclosure and non-disclosure positions in law. Where there is no previous 
contractual relationship between the same two parties, a duty of disclosure 
cannot be based on the contract itself. As Judge Posner observed, “[a] 
general duty of disclosure would turn every bargaining relationship into a 
fiduciary one,”26 which is not desirable as a matter of law. On the other 
hand, the laws of tort, deceit, and misrepresentation operate as a restraint on 
the common law non-disclosure rule. When a non-disclosure is seen as a 
wrong in the eyes of law, it has to be corrected. But it is the area between 
fraud/misrepresentation and the common law non-disclosure rule that invites 
problems. 
We have noted at least two levels of discussion regarding disclosure of 
information. On the one hand, there are debates on pre-contractual disclosure 
issues for each individual contract, particularly in the context of sales and 
insurance, where the discussion focuses on the private law impact of 
non-disclosure. On the other hand, there are many arguments on the rights 
and wrongs of mandatory disclosure rules in the securities market. 
Interestingly, these discussions show some similarities. Using a kind of 
shorthand, we might call concerns about a single transaction the “micro 
level” and those about the market the “macro level.” 
First, fairness is a key concern at both micro and macro levels. To some 
eyes non-disclosure is simply not “fair,” though why it is not fair might 
require further explanation. For example, if a private seller knows very well 
that his house is infested with termites but chooses not to say so clearly, it is 
fair to say that most buyers would feel they have been treated unfairly, if not 
fraudulently, by the seller’s concealment in this circumstance.27 The duty of 
                                                                                                                            
 25. For example, see CFTC v. Atha, 420 F.Supp.2d 1373 (N.D.Ga. 2006); CFTC v. Erskine, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26319 (N.D.Oh. 2006); CFTC v. Foley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70437 (S.D.Oh. 
2006). 
 26. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. WR Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 27. See for example, Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 
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utmost good faith in insurance law might also embrace the idea of unfairness 
and similar lines of thinking could also be found in the context of insider 
dealing.  
However, whether a conduct should be considered “unfair” to the point 
of affecting a concluded transaction is certainly subject to disagreement, so 
this is where we should be cautious about making a fairness argument, as the 
standard for unfairness is open to challenge.28 Inequality of bargaining 
power might also influence how we perceive “fairness” in a certain case; the 
same act (of non-disclosure) might be deemed acceptable practice between 
two business entities, but our conclusion might be different if it concerns a 
transaction between a business and a customer. In short, we do recognise that 
some disclosure rules might have moral underpinnings, but it is not easy to 
form a complete ethical theory as guidance for each issue of disclosure. 
Secondly, economists provide certain arguments for the view that a 
person should not be forced to disclose information which has higher 
productive value, so as to encourage people to invest in discovering this 
information. In contrast, withholding information that would produce no 
further social value (e.g. a person withholding information acquired by 
eavesdropping on other people’s conversations) may only induce more 
opportunistic behaviour.29 A few academic debates use similar but subtly 
different language on this issue.30 In an article, Eisenberg argued that a 
seller should disclose in any event but a buyer may be free from this duty if 
the information is more than foreknowledge,31 if it is not acquired through 
improper means, or if there is a relationship of trust and confidence between 
                                                                                                                            
P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960). 
 28. See generally Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 337 (1997) (arguing that because of the complexity and conflict inherent in this area of law, 
deontological ethical theory provides a better normative explanation of nondisclosure law than do the 
prevailing theories, including both economic analysis and social contract theory). 
 29. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1645 
(2003) (examining the applicability of the Disclosure Principle to a series of variables, such as whether 
the relevant information was produced adventitiously or by a deliberate investment, whether the 
information was properly acquired, whether the information is productive information or mere 
foreknowledge, whether the knowing party is a buyer or a seller, and whether the parties were in a 
relationship of trust and confidence). 
 30. For example, Kronman distinguishes information acquired casually and information obtained 
intentionally and requires the former to be disclosed but not the latter. See Anthony T. Kronman, 
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1978). Cooter 
and Ulen distinguish productive information (that could be used to produce wealth) and redistributive 
information (which only redistributes wealth) and requires the holder of the latter type to disclose. 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 273 (3d ed. 2000). See also Jack 
Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. 
ECON. REV. 561 (1971). 
 31. The concept of “foreknowledge” was first introduced by Hirshleifer in 1971 in contrast to the 
concept of “discovery.” Foreknowledge means knowledge that will be evident to all in due time, 
which means something that will be autonomously revealed. In contrast, discovery is to recognise 
something that possibly already exists, though it is hidden from view. See id. 
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parties. 32  We do not intend to enter into these debates in this paper. 
Nevertheless, we should be aware that holding material information in the 
pre-contractual stage would have certain economic effect on contractual 
parties and society.33 
Thirdly, as there are some concerns with the integrity of “prices” or the 
market, economic analysis has a stronger appeal at the macro level, 
particularly in the securities market.34 Presumably, in an efficient market, 
the current market price should reflect all the information available in the 
market. Several finance theories explore the relationship between market 
information and the market prices of securities (so-called “market 
efficiency”). 35  No matter how quickly information percolates into the 
market, it is beyond doubt that information does in fact influence the market 
and in turn investors. Thus, if a piece of material information is not disclosed 
to the market in time, this might mean traders buy or sell at the “wrong” 
price, in the sense that the price does not reflect the true market value. Thus, 
economic theories lay the foundation for the modern securities mandatory 
disclosure rule. However, we should be aware that there are other theories 
arguing against the mandatory disclosure regime in securities law.36 
Economic and moral arguments may not be mutually exclusive. While it 
seems natural to focus on the price issues on the securities market, we should 
also note that information might also influence market prices outside 
organised securities exchanges (e.g. in Laidlaw). It is not clear how far the 
wrongful price theory can be applied to non-securities markets or 
non-standardised markets. To some extent, it requires further empirical 
research to justify market efficiency and to build a link between a piece of 
information and prices in specific spot or futures markets. In contrast, where 
economic arguments seem to be dominant in the securities market, there is 
still a certain line of moral arguments that attempt to justify the use of some 
mandatory disclosure rules in the securities market, particularly regarding 
insider dealing. With regard to risk trading contracts, it is important to be 
aware of different concerns rather than relying on a single school of thought. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 32. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 1687. 
 33. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 77-85 (1981); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Do You 
Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
65 (1994). 
 34. The wrongful price theory might concur with “artificial price” arguments in defining market 
manipulation. Theories relating to non-disclosure and market manipulation might be connected in 
cases regarding insider dealing, which we will discuss in infra part 5. 
 35. For discussion on the so-called efficient capital market hypothesis, see AVGOULEAS, supra 
note 6, at 44. 
 36. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 6, at 179-83. 
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D. Summary 
 
In this part, we determined that information is important to hedging and 
speculation as the evaluation of future risks depends heavily on information 
and expertise; thus, this opens the door for people to gain profit from their 
information advantage. The general rule in common law is that one does not 
have to disclose information before a contract is made, except in certain 
exceptional situations. In addition, we also find that the laws of deceit and 
misrepresentation have a limited application to the silence of a trader in a 
pre-contractual context. Since information problems appear in every kind of 
contract, there is no reason to create a different rule in the legal structure 
merely because evaluation of risks requires a lot of information. The 
approach taken in this paper is to fit risk trading contracts into the general 
common law structure. The laws of deceit and misrepresentation could apply 
if all elements are satisfied. What we are concerned with is whether one 
party has to disclose information to another party before concluding a 
contract in the context of risk trading. In the following sections, we will try 
to fit risk trading contracts into certain exceptions to the general 
non-disclosure rule and decide whether derivative instruments naturally 
come under these exceptions. 
 
III. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN THE SECURITIES MARKET: COMPARISON 
WITH FUTURES EXCHANGE AND SECURITISED PRODUCTS  
 
Before turning to the private law side of disclosure discussion, it would 
benefit this discussion first to look at the mandatory disclosure rules in the 
securities market. It is natural to draw a comparison between the futures 
market and the securities market, since futures contracts are also traded in 
organised exchanges, like many listed securities. While it is instructive to 
note the role of the securities disclosure rule and the insider dealing rule in 
maintaining the market, we should not ignore the differences between 
securities and futures contracts that might lead to various legal implications. 
Two aspects of securities disclosure impinge upon the issuer of a stock 
or a bond. On the one hand, the issuer of a security must provide some 
information in the prospectus when first issuing or listing the securities in 
the market for investors to subscribe.37 This is disclosure in the so-called 
“primary market.” On the other hand, the issuer is subject to a continuous 
duty of disclosure after the initial public offering, periodically having to 
disclose the operation of business and relevant accounting documents. 
                                                                                                                            
 37. For UK law, see FSMA 2000 §§ 80-82; for US law, see Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 
U.S.C. 77j (2000). 
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Depending on statutory wording, key information that may have an impact 
on the market prices of the securities should also be disclosed promptly to 
the public.38 This is disclosure in the “secondary market.” In addition, the 
insider dealing rule also supplements the general securities disclosure rule 
such that an “insider” may not exploit information for his own benefit before 
the information is published through the proper channels. The exact scope of 
securities disclosure rules depends on statutory wording and thus varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The same may also be said for the insider dealing 
rule. 
Different legal consequences ensue from non-disclosure under securities 
laws, where non-disclosure does not render a contract void (as in insurance), 
but regulators may impose penalties for failure to disclose properly.39 The 
issuer or directors of the issuing company might also be liable for damage 
suffered by subscribers. 40  Where the disclosed information is false or 
misleading, there might be an overlap with the laws of deceit and 
misrepresentation. 
In addition, what is special in the securities disclosure rule is that it 
refers to general “issuance.” In the primary market, disclosure in the 
prospectus or listing particulars is prior to each individual subscription, but 
non-disclosure does not necessarily give the subscriber the right to set aside 
his subscription. In the secondary market, the issuer should disclose 
information to the market regularly or when necessary. Unlike in insurance, 
the securities disclosure rule does not refer to any specific transaction in the 
secondary market. A stockholder might sell his shares to another buyer 
without disclosing anything, unless he is under a duty to disclose or if he is 
prohibited from using his informational advantage. The insider dealing rule 
refers to individual transactions in the market made by “insiders.” As with 
securities mandatory disclosure, the insider dealing rule does not avoid a 
contract, but imposes penalties or orders disgorgement of profits as 
remedies.41 
The mandatory securities disclosure rule exists partly because of the 
nature of securities (a stock, a bond or other investment contracts as defined 
by statutes), whose price depends on the value and performance of the 
issuing company. The value of a share in a company is determined by many 
                                                                                                                            
 38. See generally FSA Handbook, Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules (hereinafter DTR); 
for US law, see SEC Regulations S-B, S-K and S-X, 17 C.F.R. parts 228, 229 and 210 (2008). 
 39. FSMA 2000 § 91. 
 40. FSMA 2000 § 90. See also Re South of England Natural Gas and Petroleum Co, Ltd., [1911] 
1 Ch. 573 (Ch.). Per Swinfen Eady J, “[i]n my opinion the allottee is not entitled to rescind his 
contract because of any breach of the statutory requirements, which extend to such comparatively 
unimportant matters as the names and addresses of the company’s auditors. His remedy is against the 
directors and other persons responsible for the prospectus.” At 577. 
 41. FSMA 2000 § 382. 
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factors, including the operation of the company, its sales figures, the 
financial management of its account, and the prospects of the issuing 
company. The price of a corporate bond is influenced by the creditworthiness 
of the issuing company which is also affected by the issuer’s performance in 
its own business. The value of a unit trust is basically decided by the 
portfolio value of the investment instruments held by the trust. Given that 
any positive or negative information could influence the market price — the 
value for holders of the securities — it is argued that the issuer should 
promptly provide correct information to the market.42 Thus, requiring the 
issuer to disclose information to the market is a way both to maintain the 
market and to ensure the efficiency of the market price. 
In contrast, this concern is less important in a futures exchange. On the 
one hand, a futures price represents the market’s expectation of the future 
(or, to some extent, traders’ expectations). A futures market is not, like the 
securities market, a spot market, so it is relevant to ask how far a futures 
price might be comparable to its corresponding spot price. The gold price for 
a December 2006 delivery contract in April 2006 is the market’s expectation 
of the value of gold in December 2006 at the time of April 2006 and of 
course this is different from spot market gold sales prices in April 2006, 
which represent the current market value of the same amount of gold if one 
wants to take immediate delivery.43 Moreover, a “true” futures price might 
not be easy to establish in any event.44 Why would we need the futures 
market if we could already establish future price with a good degree of 
accuracy? So we can only wait for the future to prove whether or not the 
futures price at a certain point of time in the past was correct. Thus, we have 
to be careful when applying the analysis developed in the spot securities 
market to the futures market. 
On the other hand, it is also probably not practical to impose a general 
duty of disclosure on every futures trader. A general mandatory disclosure 
system in the commodities market would mean that, if a farmer traded in the 
futures market, he would have to disclose information whenever he produced 
the crops for sale (cf. the primary securities market) or make periodical 
statements about the conditions of his crops whenever a specific futures 
                                                                                                                            
 42. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 6, at 45-56. 
 43. For the relationship between spot prices and corresponding futures prices, see particularly 
Mustill J’s remark in Gebruder Metelmann GmbH & Co KG v. NBR (London) Ltd., [1984] 1 LLOYD’S 
REP. 614, 623-24 (C.A.). 
 44. The “artificial price” argument might have important implication in establishing market 
manipulation. However, this “artificial price” approach has also been heavily criticised as it is difficult 
to prove an “artificial” price. Daniel R. Fishel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit 
‘Manipulation’ in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991) (attempting to provide what 
existing literature lacks — a principled analysis of concept of manipulation); see also Wendy Collins 
Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1987) 
(offering a fresh approach to defining manipulation). 
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contract remained open for trading (cf. secondary securities market). It is not 
impossible to establish this kind of regime, but it would be costly to maintain 
such a system. We should be aware that the basis of the securities disclosure 
rule is built on the basis that an issuer has to apply for authorisation from, or 
register with, the financial regulator before issuing or listing securities. The 
same does not usually apply in the commodity futures market. 
We could also examine the issue from another angle. As a US judge has 
argued, the securities market was established for the formation of capital and 
the futures market for hedging.45 It is normal that a lender attempts to 
acquire certain information about the borrower in order to ensure the return 
on his investment or to secure future repayment and yet no duty of disclosure 
is imposed in the case of loan agreements. Raising funds by way of issuing 
securities to the general public raises further concerns about investor 
protection because the general public might not be able to obtain useful 
information when making investments (compared with specialised lending 
banks giving loans or mortgages).46 In contrast, futures contracts have no 
such pedigree to justify a pre-issuance and continuous disclosure rule. 
If we follow this line of analysis, there might be good reason to apply 
the securities disclosure rule to those securitised hedging instruments as they 
may be seen as “securities.” For example, a catastrophe bond is still a bond, 
although the repayment of the bond is conditional upon the non-occurrence 
of the catastrophic events defined in the indenture.47 Securitised instruments 
are not issued like a straight corporate bond as they are usually structured 
through a special purpose vehicle (SPV).48 Nevertheless, similar concerns 
might arise with respect to these hybrid instruments and, thus, one might 
argue that hybrid instruments should be regulated as securities. Whether they 
should be treated as traditional securities (e.g. corporate shares) or be 
regulated by special rules is another matter.49 
In sum, the risk trading market is not directly comparable to the 
                                                                                                                            
 45. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1989) (per Judge 
Easterbrook). 
 46. In contrast, the US securities law exempts an issuer from the obligation to register his 
transaction if it does not involve any public offering. Security Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. 77d (2000). 
 47. Under a CAD bond, the bond issuer receives money from investors. If the catastrophic event 
does not occur, the catastrophe bond is similar to a normal bond, with periodic interest payments and a 
final principal repayment. However, if the event does occur, the bond issuer can deduct an amount 
from the principal that is returned to the bondholder. Thus, risks from a catastrophic event can be 
transferred from an insurer (as bond issuer) to the investors. SATYAJIT DAS, STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 
VOLUME 2: EQUITY; COMMODITY; CREDIT & NEW MARKETS 1212 (3d ed. rev. ed. 2006). 
 48. SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES Chapter 8 (2003); id. at chapter 
12; see also Xin Zhang, Trends and Developments in Cross-Border Securitisation, Part 1: Legal 
Structures and Analysis, 15 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 269 (2000); Geoff Fuller & Franz Ranero, 
Collateralised Debt Obligations, 20 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 343 (2005). 
 49. Tony Ciro, Game Theory in Financial Markets Litigation, 20 J. INT’L BANKING L. REG. 315 
(2005). 
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securities market. Although securities can be traded on or off exchanges like 
futures or many commodities, in the securities market the mandatory 
disclosure rule lies in the nature of securities and cannot be transposed 
seamlessly onto exchange-traded futures contracts. 
 
IV. VOIDABLE CONTRACTS: RISK TRADING AND UTMOST GOOD FAITH  
 
A. Background 
 
Insurance and guarantee contracts provide a good comparison with risk 
trading contracts. Insurance contracts are clearly intended to cover loss from 
future risks. Guarantees, on the other hand, serve the purpose of ensuring the 
performance of a debtor’s obligation.50 Interestingly, both types of contract 
are subject to a duty of disclosure but on different legal grounds. An 
insurance contract has long been labelled a contract uberrimae fidei.51 An 
assured has to disclose material information to the insurer to observe the 
duty of utmost good faith; otherwise the contract could be avoided.52 
On the other hand, there is also a duty of disclosure for contracts of 
guarantee or suretyship. It was stated that: 
 
[A] duty was imposed by the law upon creditors to disclose, when 
negotiating for a suretyship contract, all material facts — i.e., all 
facts which if disclosed would tend to incline a prudent proposed 
surety to decline to enter into such a contract, or would tend to 
persuade him to ask for a greater reward for it than had previously 
been proposed.53 
 
However, a contract of guarantee is not considered a contract uberrimae 
fidei.54 
It is necessary to explore what is meant by “utmost good faith” and why 
an insurance contract should require utmost good faith. Insurance as 
contracts uberrimae fidei can be traced back to the case of Carter v. Boehm55 
                                                                                                                            
 50. Moschi v. Lep Air Services Ltd., [1973] A.C. 331 (H.L.) (per Lord Diplock). We should be 
aware that a guarantee contract might also be regarded as insurance if it satisfies the requirements for 
an insurance contract. See Seaton v. Heath, [1899] 1 Q.B. 782, 792-793 (C.A.) (per Romer J). 
 51. Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 3 Burr 1905; Whittingham v. Thornburgh, (1690) 2 Vern 206; 23 ER 
734; Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw 7, c. 41, § 17 (Eng). See also Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. 
v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd., [1995] 1 A.C. 501 (H.L.); Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris 
Insurance Co. Ltd. (The Star Sea), [2003] 1 A.C. 469 (H.L.). 
 52. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw 7, c. 41, § 18 (Eng.). 
 53. Hamilton v. Watson, (1845) 12 C & F 109, 118.   
 54. Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No 2), [2002] 2 A.C. 773, 848 (H.L.) (per Lord Scott of 
Foscote). 
 55. Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
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in the 18th century, where Lord Mansfield stated that “[g]ood faith forbids 
either party, by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a 
bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary.”56 
While Lord Mansfield’s attempt to establish a general requirement of good 
faith in the contract law failed, it nevertheless survived in insurance law.57 
An interesting point to note is that Lord Mansfield only used the term “good 
faith,” but the Marine Insurance Act 1906 regards insurance as a contract of 
“utmost good faith.”58 
Since good faith is already a rather ambiguous concept, it is not clear 
what utmost good faith means. It has been suggested that “[t]he connotation 
appears to be the most extensive, rather than the greatest, good faith.”59 
Frequently, it is easier to identify conduct that is not in utmost good faith (or, 
more straightforwardly, is a case of “bad faith”) than to illustrate the concept 
with a positive description. The most distinguishing feature of utmost good 
faith is the duty to disclose material information.60 However, we should note 
that the duty of utmost good faith is more than just disclosure. Since it 
applies to both insurers and assureds, and it might thus also be used as a 
weapon against the insurer.61 It has been held that an insurer’s right to avoid 
a contract following non-disclosure by the assured is restricted by the duty of 
utmost good faith.62 Thus, the duty of utmost good faith restrains the 
conduct of both the assured and the insurer. We should take care in drawing 
the line between the duty of disclosure and a more general duty of utmost 
good faith.  
 
B. Foundation of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Law 
 
The inequality of knowledge is behind the doctrine of utmost good faith 
in insurance law.63 For example, a car insurer does not normally know a car 
                                                                                                                            
 56. Id. at 1910. The same principle was applied to life assurance in 17th century in Whittingham v. 
Thornburgh, (1690) 2 Vern 206; 23 ER 734 (cited in PETER MACDONALD EGGERS, GOOD FAITH AND 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 5 fn 41 (2004)). 
 57. Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd. (The Star Sea), [2003] 1 A.C. 
469, 492 (H.L.) (per Lord Hobhouse). 
 58. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw 7, c. 41, § 17 (Eng.). For historical development of the 
concept of good faith and utmost good faith, see R.A. Hasson, The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in 
Insurance Law: A Critical Evaluation, 32 M.L.R. 615 (1979). 
 59. The Star Sea, supra note 57, at 492 (per Lord Hobhouse). 
 60.  Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw 7, c. 41, §§ 18 & 20. 
 61. John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, Insurers, Claims and the Boundaries of Good Faith, 68 
M.L.R. 82 (2005); H. Y. Yeo, Post-Contractual Good Faith — Change in Judicial Attitude, 66 M.L.R. 
425 (2003). 
 62. Drake Insurance plc v. Provident Insurance plc, [2004] Q.B. 601 (C.A.). 
 63. Per Lord Mansfield, “[t]he special facts upon which the contingent chance is to be computed 
lie most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only. The underwriter trusts to his representation, 
and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge to 
mislead the underwriter into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to 
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owner’s complete driving record; nor could a health insurer normally know 
if the assured has any hidden or untold disease. Such an asymmetric spread 
of information could lead an insurer to underwrite a risk at too low a 
premium. Therefore, the insurer needs to acquire the relevant information 
from the assured in order to evaluate the proper level of risk exposure and 
determine the correct premium. However, given the direct connection 
between information and the level of premium he will pay, the assured has 
some incentive not to disclose material information to the insurer, leaving 
the insurer in a disadvantageous position. 
A common response is to argue that non-disclosure constitutes fraud.64 
However, as we saw earlier, mere silence does not automatically trigger 
misrepresentation, mistake, or the tort of deceit, and it is not always clear 
what sort of information need or need not be disclosed to the insurer. Where 
the insurer makes no specific inquiry, there is no specific reason why an 
assured should be liable for fraud or misrepresentation. The assured might 
not intend to defraud the insurer, so his silence is not necessarily a 
misrepresentation. The situation would be trickier if the insurer makes an 
inquiry but the assured decides to keep silent; nevertheless, such silence is 
not unconditionally fraud. Undoubtedly, an assured could still be liable for 
concealment of information if his actions satisfy the criteria for deceit and 
misrepresentation. However, the problem under consideration here is the 
circumstance where a concealment or non-disclosure does not constitute 
intentional deceit or misrepresentation but still raises questions of bad faith 
or unfairness. The creation of the concept of “utmost good faith” could fill 
the gap between restrictive fraudulent laws and the common law 
non-disclosure rule. 
Economic analysis could provide further support for some kind of 
disclosure requirement on the part of the assured. When insurers issue 
policies they calculate the premiums to reflect the true level of risk exposure, 
but insurance companies also try to spread the risk among other assureds 
falling into the same category. Premiums are calculated not only on the basis 
of the specific risk exposure of the assured but also on the general 
occurrence rate of this same risk in the market (e.g. the incidence of breast 
cancer among British women). Thus, the expected loss from non-disclosure 
by one assured could be transferred to other assureds by their being charged 
higher premiums than would apply in a general climate of full disclosure. In 
                                                                                                                            
estimate the risk as if it did not exist. … Although the suppression should happen through mistake 
without any fraudulent intention, … the policy is void, because the risk run is really different from the 
risk understood and intended to be run at the time of the agreement.” Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 3 Burr 
1905, 1909-1911. 
 64. Indeed, Lord Mansfield made a strong statement that “[k]eeping back such circumstance is a 
fraud.” Id. 
2009]  19 Information Disclosure, Risk Trading and the Nature of Derivative Instruments: From Common Law Perspective 
addition, full disclosure of material information by assureds might help to 
address the moral hazard issue created by asymmetric information. 65 
“Adverse selection”66 may occur when an insurer selects those with a good 
disclosure record or those relatively safe from risks as the target group for 
insurance rather than underwriting risks from the wider public. This may 
result in high-risk groups (usually those who need more protection from 
insurance) being excluded from enjoying the benefits of insurance. However, 
while economic analysis may provide some explanation of the raison d’être 
of the insurance disclosure rule, it does not explain why “utmost good faith” 
is required. 
The same grounds could also be used to explain why a contract of 
guarantee is not a contract uberrimae fidei. The scope of the guarantee 
disclosure is rather limited. In Lord Campbell’s words, the criterion is:  
 
Whether there is anything that might not naturally be expected to 
take place between the parties who are concerned in the transaction, 
that is, whether there be a contract between the debtor and the 
creditor, to the effect that his position shall be different from that 
which the surety might naturally expect; and, if so, the surety is to 
see whether that is disclosed to him.67 
 
Indeed, the information problem that arises with a guarantee is not the 
same as that in insurance. The creditor (like an assured) does not necessarily 
have an advantage in acquiring credit information about the guarantor. In 
addition, since no premium is paid between guarantor and creditor, there is 
no further economic implication to protect other creditors (like assureds). 
This also opens the door to examine the debtor-guarantor relationship and 
issues relating to duress and undue influence in order to explain why 
guarantors choose to absorb the debtor’s credit risk.68 If, as Lord Campbell 
suggests, a creditor should only disclose information that could make the 
guarantee or suretyship different from what he might naturally expect, 
misrepresentation or even mistake might be a better explanation.69 
Moreover, in the modern era, the concept of “utmost good faith” serves 
other purposes than merely dealing with the inequality of knowledge. One 
                                                                                                                            
 65. Id. at 50. 
 66. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 30, at 51. 
 67. Hamilton v. Watson, (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 109, 118-119 (per Lord Campbell), quoted in Levett 
v. Barclays Bank plc, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1260, 1276 (Q.B.). 
 68. See Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No 2), [2002] 2 A.C. 773 (H.L.); Barclays Bank plc v. 
O’Brien, [1994] 1 A.C. 180 (H.L.). 
 69. Vaughan Williams LJ took the view that “a creditor must reveal to the surety every fact which 
under the circumstances the surety would expect not to exist, for the omission to mention that such a 
fact does exist is an implied representation that it does not:” London General Omnibus Company Ltd. 
v. Holloway, [1912] 2 K.B. 72, 79 (C.A.). 
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area stressed by case law is the element of “fair dealing” in a duty of utmost 
good faith.70 To some extent, the duty of disclosure could be reconciled with 
the idea of fair dealing as one might argue that it is unfair for the assured to 
conceal material information from the insurer. 
However, it is easier to show that utmost good faith entails “fair 
dealing” than the other way round. There is always a certain degree of “fair 
dealing” in every transaction, yet those commercial transactions are not 
treated as contracts of utmost good faith. In modern times, when insurance 
companies are generally more powerful than most assureds, it is also more 
difficult to base the duty of utmost good faith on the ground of fair dealing 
and impose a heavier duty of disclosure on the assured, who has less 
bargaining power.  
Lastly, requiring the assured to disclose material information is one 
thing, but determining the materiality is another. It could be linked to as an 
assured’s duty to disclose or not to conceal information when the insurer 
makes an inquiry. Given that modern insurers are generally more expert at 
their business than assureds, an insurer should, in general, have a better idea 
of what information is required. Thus, there is a trend in insurance law to 
impose more responsibility on the insurer to make inquiry rather than relying 
on the assured to disclose information.71 The development of the duty of 
disclosure in insurance law is a topic of its own and we need not enter into 
details here. However, it is important to note that bargaining power and fair 
dealing arguments can be incorporated into the discussion of the duty of 
utmost good faith. 
Two conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion. First, it is 
the inequality of knowledge between assured and insurer regarding insured 
risks that is behind the duty of utmost good faith and the duty of disclosure 
in insurance law. The duty of utmost good faith could fill in the gap left 
between fraud laws and the common law non-disclosure rule. Secondly, the 
duty of good faith has a modern application in addressing the inequality of 
bargaining power and issues of fair dealing, notably in restricting the 
advantages of powerful insurers. It is on this ground that we will proceed 
with our arguments for the use of utmost good faith in risk trading contracts.  
 
                                                                                                                            
 70. The Star Sea, supra note 57, 491-95 (per Lord Hobhouse); see also Pan Atlantic Insurance 
Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd., [1995] 1 A.C. 501 (H.L.). 
 71 . See generally JULIE-ANNE TARR, DISCLOSURE AND CONCEALMENT IN CONSUMER 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS (2002); Anthony A. Tarr & Julie-Anne Tarr, The Insured’s Non-Disclosure in 
the Formation of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Perspective, 50 INT’L. COMP. L.Q. 577 (2001) 
(arguing that the departure from caveat emptor and the allocation of the risk and consequences of 
non-disclosure to the party will be best placed to provide information pertinent to the transaction is 
seen as necessary to minimise transaction costs in such dealings). 
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C. Risk Trading and Utmost Good Faith 
 
1. Exchange Trading 
 
Let us start with exchange trading contracts. Exchange-futures contracts 
are highly standardised such that the exchange contract has become the 
subject matter of trading instead of the underlying commodity.72 Since 
exchange contracts are so standardised, futures trading does not involve a lot 
of negotiation of terms, except prices and the number of contracts. There is 
no inquiry and no concealment as traders are not expected to ask or disclose 
anything other than the desired trading price and the number of contracts on 
the trading floor or in the computer system. Any disclosure, if required, 
should be made to the exchange rather than to the counterparty during 
trading. Thus, it would be meaningless to argue that an exchange contract 
requires utmost good faith. In contrast, since a trader must have a 
membership agreement with the exchange and a non-member must have a 
brokerage or similar agreement with an exchange member,73 the issue of 
disclosure in the exchange market could be analysed as a matter of 
post-contractual disclosure. 
It is undeniable that we expect some form of good faith in exchange 
trading, much as we do in the cases of other commercial contracts. Most 
traders hope the prices on the market are reliable and reflect the current state 
of the market or expectations, so they do not want instances of market 
manipulation or insider dealing. If market manipulation and insider dealing 
are important concerns, we have to consider whether it is better to address 
these problems with special rules rather than imposing a general duty of 
utmost good faith on all futures trading. Given that there are many kinds of 
futures contracts and traders in the market, a general duty of utmost good 
faith might in turn make futures transactions fiduciary relationships, a 
situation that even the securities market has not yet reached. 
 
2. Over-the-Counter Trading 
 
In relation to the over-the-counter (OTC) market, the issue of good faith 
could be examined from several perspectives. The complexity of hedging 
products and the fast-changing environment of the market makes it difficult 
                                                                                                                            
 72. In a way, futures transactions trade “in the contract,” while commercial sales trade “in the 
commodity.” CFTC v. Zelender, 373 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2004) (per Judge Easterbrook). 
 73. For example, in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), a non-clearing member must have a 
clearing agreement with a clearing member, who becomes the “primary clearing member” for that 
non-member. The existence of a primary clearing member is the pre-condition to trading by 
non-members. See CBOT Rule 207.01. For its text, available at http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/ 
cont_detail/0,3206,931+32175,00.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
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to reach a single and definitive conclusion on all off-exchange transactions. 
However, until off-exchange hedging contracts become more consumerised, 
there is no need to use the concept of “utmost good faith” to address the 
information problem. Instead, it is more likely that issues of insider dealing 
or market manipulation will be introduced. 
Let us examine the nature of risks and their evaluation in the case of an 
insurance contract and OTC derivative instruments. In the case of insurance, 
one may argue that the evaluation of risk exposure is to a certain extent 
individualised.74 For example, the determination of the correct premium 
level for a motor insurance contract depends partly on the driving record of 
the driver. For health insurance, the insurer needs to know the health 
condition of the assured in order to calculate how much risk he is exposed to. 
But this information might not be accessible to the insurer without the 
assured’s disclosure and, even with some kinds of standardisation in effect, 
when issuing a policy the insurer still has to know some of the assured’s 
personal information.75 Thus, there is a larger margin for the assured to 
exploit the insurer’s lack of knowledge. 
In contrast, the personal element seems to be much diluted in derivative 
instruments. For market hedging, the risk exposure comes from the 
fluctuation of the market, which in principle should be external to the control 
of any risk seller or risk buyer (cf. assureds and insurers, respectively). The 
evaluation of market risk does not depend on the risk seller’s special 
knowledge as market data is, in theory, open to all traders to discover. Thus, 
risk sellers do not necessarily have better knowledge than risk buyers.76 A 
risk buyer might even have equal or better access to information than a risk 
seller, so there is no apparent inequality of knowledge in the derivatives 
market similar to that in the insurance market. 
The same could also be argued for standard credit derivatives.77 In a 
typical credit default swap (CDS),78 the risk seller tries to transfer to the risk 
                                                                                                                            
 74. Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, 
Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 191 (2007). 
 75. It has also been argued that marine insurance still relies on individualised calculation of risks 
and negotiation. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance Law: A 
Comparative Analysis of American and English Law, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 3-4 and notes 13 & 14 
(1998). 
 76. Save for the situation where the risk seller himself generates information that could influence 
the market. 
 77. Credit derivatives can be defined as “a class of financial instrument, the value of which is 
derived from an underlying market value driven by the credit risk of private or government entities 
other than the counterparties to the credit derivative transaction itself.” SATYAJIT DAS, CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES: CDOS & STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS 6 (3d ed. 2005). 
 78. In a credit default swap (CDS), a party wishing to hedge the credit risk of a “reference 
obligation” (e.g. a bond) makes a fixed payment periodically or in a lump sum and receives payment 
from the other party if the “reference entity” (e.g. the bond issuer) defaults, thereby allowing 
bondholders to hedge the credit risks of the bond issuer. The credit default swap has evolved to cover 
2009]  23 Information Disclosure, Risk Trading and the Nature of Derivative Instruments: From Common Law Perspective 
buyer the credit risk of the bonds or other credit instruments he holds. Risk 
buyer and the risk seller probably have equal access to information 
concerning the credit risk of the third party issuer.79 So, the basic inequality 
of knowledge issue does not necessarily arise. 
However, the above analysis is based on an assumption that market or 
credit risks are foreign to both hedgers and speculators, whether they are risk 
buyers or sellers — if they have equal access to the information, there seems 
to be no need to ask one party to disclose to the other. Nevertheless, there are 
some circumstances where this assumption might be false. First, with the 
advancement of financial engineering, a derivative transaction might be 
designed so as to incorporate a party’s personal traits. For example, there 
exists the so-called “self-linked” credit derivative, where the risk seller 
actually sells his own credit risks or those of persons connected to him (e.g. 
a parent company or a subsidiary).80 This may resemble insurance in some 
aspects because risk buyers for such credit derivative instruments might not 
know as much as the risk seller with regard to the credit risk of the reference 
entity. 
Secondly, where one person conducts a market manipulative scheme to 
work the market to his favour, to some extent, he has better knowledge of 
potential market fluctuation than other traders (because he causes it). “Moral 
hazard” problems might also arise for credit derivative transactions, where 
the risk buyer “manufactures” a credit event in his favour.81 It has happened 
that a lender, purchasing credit default swaps to protect against the credit 
risk of the loans made to borrowers, intentionally restructured the loans to 
trigger the payment obligation of a CDS.82 To date, credit derivatives 
transactions are conducted mainly between banks and financial or business 
entities. Thus, concerns about moral hazard might be reduced because the 
risk buyer is usually capable of spotting potential problems and protecting 
himself contractually. However, as the design of derivative instruments 
becomes more personalised, this will create asymmetric information and 
moral hazard problems similar to those of the insurance field. 
Thirdly, where a trader is a corporate insider who has more inside 
knowledge than other traders, this creates a situation similar to insider 
dealing in the context of securities laws. Arguably, there could be unequal 
                                                                                                                            
not only the default of a single debt instrument but also the default of one or several debt instruments 
in a portfolio. See id. 
 79. This is based on an assumption that both the risk buyer and the risk seller are business entities 
and are generally equal in capacity of making business or financial judgments.   
 80. Simon Firth, Self-referenced Credit Derivatives — Are They Enforceable under English Law?, 
1(1) CAP. MARKET. L.J. 21 (2006). 
 81. Simon Bezzina, The Protection Seller’s Scylla and Charybdis: Negotiating the Moral Hazard 
Straits in ISDA -based Cash-settled Credit Default Swaps, 20 J. INT’L BANKING L. REG. 600 (2005). 
 82. SATYAJIT DAS, STRUCTURED PRODUCTS VOLUME 2: EQUITY; COMMODITY; CREDIT & NEW 
MARKETS 743-44 (3d ed. rev. ed. 2006). 
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accessibility to information (even for a short period of time). As to the 
hedging market, potential insider dealing could be solved by extending the 
insider dealing rule commonly seen in securities regulation. We will address 
this issue later in this paper. 
Fourthly, one day, risk trading products might become more 
consumerised, which is to say they will be sold to individual consumers 
rather than to more sophisticated business entities. The resultant inequality 
of bargaining power might imply an inequality of information about 
products, the market and the underlying risks. Thus, one could make a 
further argument to support the imposition of a “good faith” duty upon the 
stronger side. However, we should be aware that in a typical insurance 
context it is the assured (usually having less bargaining power) who 
possesses useful information, rather than the insurer (who usually has greater 
bargaining power). If the risk trading market becomes more consumerised, it 
would be the product seller who had better knowledge and expertise rather 
than individual consumers. This could necessitate further duties on the part 
of brokers/dealers or financial promoters, or raise so-called suitability 
issues.83 
The above discussion shows that it would be inappropriate to reject the 
idea of the contract uberrimae fidei merely on the basis of the argument that 
the risk evaluation of derivative instruments is not individualised. There are 
indeed circumstances that in which information is asymmetric and moral 
hazard problems arise, as in insurance law. 
However, imposing a duty of utmost good faith is only one of the 
possible ways to deal with potential information problems. There may be 
some instances of “bad faith” trading or concealment that could damage the 
market and investors. The question we face here is how far the problem 
could be addressed by a duty of utmost good faith or a duty of disclosure. If 
breaching a duty of utmost good faith results in a contract being avoided (as 
in section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906), the significant legal 
consequences and legal uncertainties involved might not justify the benefits 
accruing from such a duty. Avoiding contracts requiring only a single 
performance (like options) is relatively easy to tackle. However, where there 
are multiple performances (like an interest rate swap), avoiding contracts 
may create complicated restitution issues, like the series of local authority 
cases that arose in the UK,84 especially when the contract has run some time 
                                                                                                                            
 83. See for example, Bankers Trust International plc v. PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, [1996] 
CLC 518 (Q.B.); Peekay Intermark Ltd. v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., [2006] 2 
LLOYD’S REP. 511 (C.A.); De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002); 
K3C Inc. v. Bank of America, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27437 (5th Cir. 2006); Power & Telephone 
Supply Company, Inc. v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., 447 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 84. See Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, [1992] 2 A.C. 1 (H.L.); 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council, [1996] A.C. 669 (H.L.); 
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for part of its term. As OTC documentation grows more complicated, 
breaking the contractual scheme might lead to more problems than solutions. 
In addition, several regulatory regimes already exist to deal with these 
issues. Market manipulation and insider dealing are already punishable by 
statutes. To some extent, problems may be solved contractually.85 We should 
also consider whether courts are better equipped to decide market 
manipulation and price issues (if we take the good faith approach), rather 
than relying on regulators or other professionals. There is still room for 
development. 
In sum, it is too much to argue that all OTC derivative transactions 
should be treated as kinds of contracts of utmost good faith. Most 
instruments lack the personal element that we have seen in the case of 
insurance policies. Even for those instruments which have some degree of 
personalisation and require a certain amount of good faith before the contract 
is made, it is arguable that there are other better ways of dealing with them 
than imposing a duty of utmost good faith and avoiding a contract for failure 
to honour such duties. After all, derivative instruments are based on 
contracts. If one party believes that a certain type of information is 
important, he might simply ask the other party about it or insert a special 
term to address the issue. If no inquiry is made and no such term inserted, 
why should we not rest with: let the buyer be aware? 
 
3. Guarantee and Credit Default Swap 
 
Lastly, let us consider the case of applying a duty similar to a guarantee 
contract to particular credit default swaps (CDS). As mentioned earlier, a 
guarantee contract and a standard CDS share some similarities as they both 
deal with the credit default of a debtor, where a guarantor, as a secondary 
debtor, pays off the debts of the principal debtor.86 In a credit default swap, a 
risk buyer compensates the loss in value, usually by way of repaying to the 
risk seller the difference between the par value of the debt instrument (bonds 
or loans) and its current market price after default or by buying out the debt 
instrument from the risk seller. In this way, a CDS ensures that a bondholder 
(or the lender of a loan) can reclaim back the money to which he is entitled. 
If a guarantor has a claim on avoiding his guarantee contract when the 
principal debt is greatly different from what he knew,87 could a risk buyer in 
                                                                                                                            
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Birmingham City Council, [1997] Q.B. 380 (C.A.); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. 
Lincoln City Council, [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.). 
 85. See Bezzina, supra note 81; see also Steven Edwards, The Law of Credit Derivatives, J. BUS. 
L. 617, 646 (2004). 
 86. For more thorough analysis of the accessory nature of a guarantee contract, see Johan Steyn, 
Guarantees: the Co-extensiveness Principle, 90 L.Q.R. 246 (1974). 
 87. Cf. Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd. v. Credit du Nord SA, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 255 
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a CDS enjoy the same claim? 
In reality, it is rather unlikely that a risk seller would agree to take on the 
credit risks of a third party unless the instrument(s) requiring hedging were 
specified.88 This would have two kinds of effects. On the one hand, since it 
is specified, the risk buyer just has to perform the contract as it is. If the risk 
buyer decides to take the credit risks associated with Bond A and if, 
unfortunately, Bond A is in default, the risk buyer should bear the fruits. It 
does not matter if the risk seller does not hold any Bond A or if he holds 
Bond B instead of Bond A as stated in the agreement.  
On the other hand, a CDS could be synthetic or purely speculative 
(meaning no loans or bonds are actually held). In the case of a guarantee, 
such kinds of disclosure are important and necessary because the guarantor’s 
obligation is closely linked to the principal obligation. If the principal 
obligation differs from what was agreed at the beginning, the extent of the 
guarantor’s secondary obligation changes accordingly. The same rationale 
regarding disclosure does not hold in the case of a CDS. This does not mean 
that a risk buyer has no claim if the underlying credit obligation greatly 
exceeds what was expected — he may be able to seek remedies using the 
doctrine of mistake or misrepresentation. It is simply that guarantees and 
CDS are not comparable in terms of pre-contractual disclosure issues.  
 
4. Summary 
 
In this part, we focused on the issue of whether risk trading contracts 
could be seen as another type of contract uberrimae fidei in which a duty of 
utmost good faith dictates a duty of disclosure. Apart from definitional issues 
relating to insurance and derivatives, we found that it would be difficult to 
extend the sort of duty of utmost good faith applied in insurance to the 
derivatives market. The inequality of knowledge that underlines the 
insurance disclosure rule does not necessarily exist in the case of other 
hedging instruments. We failed to find significant differences between 
derivative instruments and other commercial contracts, which have no 
utmost good faith requirement. However, we also noted that problems 
similar to those found in insurance may arise in the risk trading market if an 
instrument is linked to the risk buyer himself. More problems may arise as 
the market becomes more consumerised and individualised. Some of these 
                                                                                                                            
(Q.B.). 
 88. This would be the case of a CDS being used to cover credit exposure on bond or loan. But if a 
CDS structure is employed to address the credit risk of another derivative transaction (e.g. an interest 
rate swap), the CDS then becomes a “swap guarantee” or a “market risk contingent credit default 
swap.” In this situation, the credit exposure that underlies the CDS becomes more dynamic than that of 
a conventional CDS. See DAS, supra note 77, at 156-58. 
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issues could be resolved by further examination of contractual parties rather 
than by the nature of the contract itself. 
 
V. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
Following above analysis, we will further examine whether there is a 
kind of special relationship between parties to a derivative transaction. We 
will start by discussing the use of contracts to control disclosure issues 
before a specific transaction is made. We will then consider whether the 
relationship between the two parties is of a kind that could raise a fiduciary 
relationship such that one party would have to disclose to the other party 
certain information in order to observe his fiduciary duties. 
 
A. Risk Trading and Fiduciary Relationship  
 
Let us first determine whether risk trading contracts can automatically 
entail fiduciary duties such that one party (as a fiduciary) has to disclose 
material information to the other party before a transaction. Not every type 
of relationship is of the kind of fiduciary in nature. In general:  
 
[t]he paradigm of the circumstances in which equity will find a 
fiduciary relationship is where one party, A, has assumed to act in 
relation to the property or affairs of another, B. A, having assumed 
responsibility, pro tanto, for B’s affairs, is taken to have assumed 
certain duties in relation to the conduct of those affairs, including 
normally a duty of care.89 
 
Fiduciary duties usually arise in a situation where one person is required 
to take care of the interests of another person or persons and where we 
expect him not to advance his own interests before those of the other party or 
parties. 90  Three types of relationships exemplifying the fiduciary 
relationship are the trustee-beneficiary relationship, principal-agent 
relationship, and director-company relationship. Trustee, agent, and 
corporate director have to serve the best interests of the beneficiary, the 
principal, and the company respectively. 
Once a fiduciary relationship is proven to obtain, fiduciary duties 
consist of at least two aspects. On the one hand, “[t]he distinguishing 
                                                                                                                            
 89. White v. Jones, [1995] 2 A.C. 207, 271 (H.L.) (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson).   
 90. According to Finn, “the central idea [of fiduciary duties] is service of another’s interests.”  
Paul Finn, Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUST 
AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 9 ( Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992). 
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obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty;”91 thus, the fiduciary 
should not put himself in a position creating a conflict of interest with the 
other party or put his own interests ahead of the other party’s. On the other 
hand, a fiduciary owes a fiduciary duty of care to serve the benefits of the 
other party, the exact scope of which duty of care depends on the 
relationship between the two parties. The reasonable care expected of a 
corporate director might not be the same as that expected of the trustee of an 
estate; thus, the extent of a fiduciary duty of care should be decided on a 
case-by-case basis.92 However, as far as information and disclosure are 
concerned, it may be argued that to observe his duty of care or to avoid a 
conflict of interest the fiduciary might have to disclose certain material 
information to the other party prior to a specific transaction.93 The duty to 
report is also embedded in fiduciary relationship.94 
The key is still to establish a fiduciary relationship in the first instance.95 
It should be noted that a bank-customer relationship is generally not 
considered a fiduciary relationship but only a contractual one.96 However, it 
has been suggested that where a situation involves the trust and confidence 
of one party or where there is an assumption of responsibility, special 
relationships other than trust and agency might raise a fiduciary duty of 
care.97 The US law also takes a similar position.98  
Despite the fact that there is no clear definition of fiduciary relationship, 
we could draw a tentative conclusion that a fiduciary relationship requires 
“trust and confidence.” From this point of view, it is clear that derivative 
instruments alone do not generally create the kind of relationship requiring 
trust and confidence. It is not in the nature of these instruments to require 
authority, management, or forwarding other people’s best interests; neither 
                                                                                                                            
 91. Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1, 18 (C.A.) (per Millett LJ). 
 92. Per Lord Browne-Wilkson, “[a]lthough the extent of those fiduciary duties (including duties 
of care) will vary from case to case, some duties (including a duty of care) arise in each case.” White v. 
Jones, supra note 89, at 271. 
 93. See e.g., Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.). 
 94. See Leitch v. Abbott, (1886) 31 Ch.D. 374 (C.A.). 
 95. Nevertheless, to determine whether a person is fiduciary, we might have to resort to the nature 
of the fiduciary duties. In Finn’s words, “[i]t is not because a person is a ‘fiduciary’ or a ‘confidant’ 
that a rule applies to him. It is because a particular rule applies to him that he is a fiduciary or 
confidant for its purposes.” PAUL FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 2 (1977). See also Bristol and West 
Building Society v. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1, 18 (C.A.) (per Millett LJ). 
 96. See generally ALASTAIR HUDSON, LAW ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES § 7-30 (4th ed. 2006). 
See also Foley v. Hill, [1848] 2 H.L.C. 28. In National Westminster Bank plc v. Morgan, [1985] A.C. 
686 (C.A.), the court held that a bank-customer relationship was not the kind of ordinary relationship 
that raised the presumption of undue influence. At 707 (per Lord Scarman). 
 97. White v. Jones, [1995] A.C. 207 (H.L.) (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson). See also Woods v. 
Martins Bank Ltd., [1959] 1 Q.B. 55 (Q.B.); United Pan-European Communications NV v. Deutsche 
Bank AG, [2000] EWCA Civ. 166. 
 98. See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002); K3C Inc. v. 
Bank of America, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27437 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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does insurance or a sale. Thus, we could conclude that a risk trading contract 
does not automatically raise fiduciary duties. This is also the position taken 
by US judges to date.99 
This paper does not argue that a fiduciary relationship may never arise 
between any given two parties. A fiduciary relationship may be established if 
a trust and confidence relationship is proved, but this could only be decided 
on a case-by-case basis. What we argue in this section is that risk trading 
contracts alone do not necessarily entail fiduciary duties, but we do not 
exclude the possibility that fiduciary duties might arise from the two parties’ 
other dealings. 
 
B. Fiduciary Duties and Exchange Brokers 
 
Further to the above discussion, let us consider the relationship between 
an exchange broker and his client. In the context of exchange trading, traders 
who are not members of an exchange have to go through a firm or a person 
who is a member and who will place trades for him.100 Usually the member 
trades on his own account, even though he is receiving orders from a 
customer. Therefore, although it may look as if the customer is trading on the 
futures market through a brokerage firm, there are, in fact, two parts to the 
transaction: one between the member firm in the exchange, and the other 
between the firm and the customer. For convenience, we may loosely call the 
member firm a “broker.” 101  In this context, we may approach the 
information issue in several ways. 
First, information could move from either side of the broker-client 
relationship. On the one hand, if the client holds material information that is 
unknown to the broker, this situation is similar to those we discussed in the 
previous sections. Since a customer could hardly be treated as a fiduciary to 
the broker, it would be difficult to require the client to disclose on the 
grounds of fiduciary duties.  
On the other hand, the analysis will be different if it is the broker who 
holds material information and does not tell the client before the latter places 
an order. Since a broker deals with the customer’s orders, an agency 
                                                                                                                            
 99. In Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals 
Trading Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), a US judge also held that “a fiduciary duty does not 
arise in the normal course of an arm’s-length business transaction. … [C]ourts have held that a 
financial products dealer … normally does not undertake a fiduciary duty when it acts as a principal in 
transactions with an institutional counterparty in which no trading discretion is conferred.” At 150. 
 100. The number of traders who can commit trading directly in a futures exchange is limited by 
membership (often requiring a substantial membership fee). Those who are not members but who 
wish to trade in a futures exchange have to enter into a brokerage agreement with a member. 
 101. An exchange member could hire another exchange member to trade for him. A specialist 
floor trader might also conduct trades for another member firm. The relationship in these situations is 
similar to a broker-client relationship. 
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relationship could obtain between them that might raise fiduciary duties.102 
Even without financial regulation of the behaviour of financial brokers (if 
they are regulated persons),103 there are certain common law rules on the 
relationship between parties as to the handling of orders and the movement 
of money or properties.104 Thus, there is the possibility of raising fiduciary 
duties to deal with information issues in the broker-client relationship. It then 
depends on the scope of the duties owed by the broker. If a broker only 
handles orders for the client without giving any advice or being given any 
discretion, it is arguable whether the duty of the broker could include 
informing the client as to a piece of material information.105 In contrast, if 
the client has authorised the broker to use his discretion when trading, there 
is a higher chance that the broker is under a duty to disclose relevant market 
information.106 
Secondly, in a broker-client relationship, further bargaining power and 
investor protection concerns could arise. A client could be a sophisticated 
business entity who does not have membership in an exchange. He could 
also be an individual investor who wishes to hedge or speculate in the 
futures market. Thus, it would be false to assume that there is always 
unequal bargaining power between a broker and a client. On the other hand, 
the contract between a broker and a client could be a standardised form 
drawn up by the broker without any negotiation. Further concerns might 
come into play if a broker has greater bargaining power, which allows him to 
insert terms necessary to protect him from any information advantage.107 
Thirdly, it would be a different story if a broker assumed the role of an 
investment adviser rather than merely a broker. It would be even more 
complicated if we took into account the law of negligence and the potential 
duty of confidentiality owed by the broker, who might have to take care in 
drafting his contract and in the wording of his advice to customers to avoid 
any exposure to liability. 
                                                                                                                            
 102. In Brandeis Brokers Ltd. v. Black, [2001] 2 LLOYD’S REP. 359 (Q.B.), Toulson J upheld the 
decision of arbitrators that Brandeis had an agency relationship (and thus fiduciary relationship) with 
Black, his client, even when Brandeis traded in the futures market as an undisclosed principal (for a 
discretionary account of Mr. Black). See infra 5.5.2.2 for more details of this judgment. 
 103. For example, the FSA Handbook, COBS 11 provides some rules to regulate how a 
broker/dealer should deal with a customer’s order. 
 104. See Stafford v. Conti Commodity Services Ltd., [1981] 1 LLOYD’S REP. 466 (Q.B.). 
 105. In De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002), the US court 
took the view that a broker for a non-discretionary account does not normally hold any fiduciary duty 
or additional duty to disclose to or advise his client. 
 106. Cf. Brandeis Brokers Ltd. v. Black, [2001] 2 LLOYD’S REP. 359 (Q.B.). 
 107. A similar line of analysis was taken in the US law. The client’s level of sophistication is an 
essential factor when determining whether there is a fiduciary relationship between a broker and a 
client. Barbara C. Matthews, Derivatives, Fiduciary Obligations and Codes of Conduct, in SWAPS AND 
OFF-EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES TRADING: LAW AND REGULATION (Eric C. Bettelheim et al. eds., 
1996). 
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VI. INSIDER DEALING 
 
If the above analysis shows that the mandatory disclosure system in 
securities regulations might not work well in the non-securities market, and 
that the duty of utmost good faith is not suitable for non-insurance risk 
trading contracts, there is still one type of non-disclosure that might be seen 
as wrong but is not addressed by common law remedies. Insider dealing 
(also called “insider trading”) has long attracted academic interest. The 
insider dealing rule does not directly impose a duty of disclosure; instead, 
the insider dealing rule prohibits an insider from using his information 
advantage before the information has been published in a proper manner. 
The rule is largely based on statute. 
An insider dealing transaction is a transaction where an “insider” uses 
his privileged access to inside information to make profit on the market 
before this information is disclosed to the public. Insider dealing problems 
are usually discussed in the context of securities markets. For example, a 
typical case of insider dealing in the securities market would be if a director 
at Northern Rock sold his shares in the company ahead of a new financial 
report on Northern Rock’s performance, being aware that the report is much 
worse than the market expected. If, in contrast, he chooses to go long or 
short on NASDAQ futures, he is still profiting from his inside knowledge 
but he has crossed the line into the derivative market. 
The same thing could also happen in the commodities market. Broadly 
speaking, any information advantage could lead to some kinds of insider 
dealing, whether it is related to securities or not. If the opportunistic buyer in 
Laidlaw v. Organ had been the agent of one of the representatives signing 
the peace treaty, he would have been using insider information for his own 
profit. Osama Bin Laden could likewise have made huge profits by making 
currency or oil transactions before or after the September 11 attack (if he had 
found a way to launder his money). Or, to give a rather more cinematic 
example, a person gifted with supernatural powers over the weather (such as 
in the movie X-Men) could earn a fortune simply by buying weather futures 
and using his powers to change weather patterns to his own advantage.108 
Given the speculative nature of derivative instruments and the close 
                                                                                                                            
 108. Similar things could also happen to gambling contracts. For example, a horse owner knows 
that his horse has absolutely no chance of winning a race (for a reason not yet known to the public and 
which could influence the odds). Before the information is leaked, the owner could lay (or sell) odds 
in a betting exchange and thus win some money. In this horseracing story, the owner (as one party to a 
gambling transaction) knows something that is not known to the other party. The owner is apparently 
an insider and he uses his information to his advantage before the information becomes known to the 
other. The question is whether the owner has to disclose this information and whether, as far as our 
argument in this section is concerned, this is the kind of transaction that could be defined as a type of 
“cheating.” 
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connection with current financial markets, it is no surprise that insider 
dealing might extend from the traditional securities market to futures or 
other derivatives markets. However, it is not clear how far the insider dealing 
rule should and could address potential information problems. In this part, 
we will examine potential insider dealing problems by using derivative 
instruments. We will not limit ourselves to a narrow meaning of “insider 
dealing” in the stock market. In contrast, we will explore a broader range of 
circumstances wherein a person uses his inside knowledge unknown to other 
market participants to conduct risk trading. 
 
A. Current Laws and Underlying Theories 
 
Before moving on to some potential insider dealing problems in the 
hedging market, we should first understand what insider dealing means and, 
more importantly, why insider dealing is deemed wrong in the securities 
market. In the UK, insider dealing was already considered a criminal offence 
under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA 1993)109 before the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) made it a kind of “market 
abuse.”110 We should be aware that the CJA 1993 uses explicit terms like 
“insider” and “inside information” and limits criminal liability to dealings 
with securities, which include not only stock and bonds but also options, 
futures, and contracts for differences involving purchases or sales of 
securities.111 On the other hand, the FSMA 2000 has a broader application 
without specific reference to “securities” or “insider.”112 The FSMA 2000 
makes it clear that the penalty imposed for market abuse does not make a 
transaction void or unenforceable.113 Thus, insider dealing behaviour does 
not render a transaction void. However, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) might make a restitution order where necessary 114  and impose 
penalties for violators.115 
In contrast, US law shows a different style. The foundation of the 
modern insider dealing rule in the US securities regulations lies in the 
anti-fraud provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934116 and the SEC 
                                                                                                                            
 109. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, § 52. 
 110. FSMA 2000 § 118. See also FSA Handbook, MAR 1.3. 
 111. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, Schedule 2 (Eng.). 
 112. FSMA 2000 § 118. The FSA handbook broadly refers to insider dealing of “qualifying 
investment,” defined by the Treasury as all investments prescribed by the FSMA 2000 section 22 in 
recognised investment exchanges. FSA Handbook, MAR 1.3 and The Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (Prescribed Markets and Qualifying Investments) Order 2001, SI 2001/996, Articles 4 & 5. 
 113. FSMA 2000 § 131. 
 114. FSMA 2000 § 382 . 
 115. FSMA 2000 §§ 123 & 129. 
 116. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j (2000). 
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Rule 10b-5,117 which make it unlawful to employ any manipulative or 
deceptive device (or any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud) in 
contravention of SEC rules and regulations. Thus, the US insider dealing law 
has a strong reference to “fraud,” without explicitly using the term “insider 
dealing” (or “insider trading”). 
A breakthrough in insider dealing law occurred in the 1960s. The rule 
was largely developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the US courts.118 We should be aware that violation of the anti-provision 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 might grant victims private 
cause of actions to sue for damages.119 A corporate director or officer might 
also have to disgorge his profits to the issuer company if he uses inside 
information to make profit.120 
Regardless of the meaning of “inside information,”121 the meaning of 
“insider” appears to determine how far insider dealing rules in the securities 
market can reach. Corporate directors, managers and employees are the most 
usual type of “insider.”122 In both the UK and the US, a tippee, who receives 
tips from corporate insiders, is also liable for insider dealing.123 We also 
expect professionals (such as solicitors or accountants) who have access to 
inside information not to use it before it is published.124 
However, there are always some difficult boundary cases. In US v. 
Chiarella,125 the court faced a situation where an employee of a financial 
printer somehow decoded the messages as to the target companies of 
takeover bids using his own skills. Should Mr. Chiarella be liable even 
though he was neither a corporate insider nor a professional? He did not 
even have a direct contractual relationship with the company (but only with 
his immediate employer). 
This case raised a fundamental problem: why is insider dealing 
prohibited? One fundamental difficulty in forming the foundation for 
                                                                                                                            
 117. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2008). 
 118. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 
833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 119. See Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 
(1971); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).   
 120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. 78p(b). This section applies to corporate 
directors and officers when they use inside information to buy securities or securities-related 
instruments and when profits are realised within 6 months. The purpose of this section is to prevent 
“unfair” use of information. 
 121. See Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, § 56 (Eng.). It is also frequently called non-public 
material information in US judgments. 
 122. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, § 57(2)(a)(i) (Eng.). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 123. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, § 57(2)(b) (Eng.). For US law, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 
646 (1983); Carpenter v. US, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 124. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, § 57(2)(a)(ii) (Eng.). For US law, see US v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642 (1997). 
 125. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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prohibition of insider dealing is identifying the victims. The victims of an 
insider dealing scheme could be the company itself, shareholders, 
counterparties to the trading contracts, other outside investors, or the market 
in general. For each type of victim one might develop a theory to justify 
insider dealing rules. This paper does not claim to specialise in insider 
dealing theory, but it is necessary to understand certain concerns about 
insider dealing before continuing our analysis. 
First, the special relationship between parties (notably the fiduciary 
relationship) is the basis of the insider dealing rule; thus, insider dealing 
might be seen to be wrong because the insider breaches his duty.126 The 
drawback of this approach is obvious, as it cannot explain the application of 
the insider dealing rule beyond corporate directors and professionals (e.g. 
why a tippee is liable for insider dealing). Secondly, a wider view is that the 
insider misappropriates information that does not belong to him.127 Further 
development of this line of thinking could extend to render the tippee 
liable.128 Thirdly, one may further argue that inside information is a kind of 
protected property, such that an insider should not use it without the 
information having already been disclosed.129 
Fourthly, if we look at the bigger scale, insider dealing might have 
implications for the market. Price and market efficiency are major concerns. 
There are already plenty of economic arguments about how quickly 
information can be reflected in the market in terms of price and how insider 
dealing influences the price of securities.130 On the other hand, there are also 
arguments to the contrary, with some authors arguing that insider dealing 
might in fact push price toward a more accurate position.131 If price is the 
major concern, it is the market and investors as a whole that are the victims. 
In contrast, it is arguable that it is the issuing company (whose information is 
exploited by the insider before being published) that is the victim because its 
information is misappropriated. But it is also arguable whether the company 
suffers any loss at all in this circumstance. 
Fifthly, some commentators turn to a moral explanation of why insider 
                                                                                                                            
 126. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).   
 127. US v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 128. David T. Cohen, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the Personal Benefit Requirement for 
Tipper/Tippee Liability under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547 
(2006). 
 129. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of 
the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider 
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Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions against Insider Trading: Why A Property Rights 
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 130. See supra note 6, at 80-85. 
 131 . Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 335. 
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dealing is wrong. In Chiarella, Justice Blackmun argued that insider dealing 
without disclosure is “inherently unfair.” 132  However, justifying the 
“fairness” argument also requires much deeper analysis than a mere 
statement that insider dealing is unfair.133 The appeal of moral theories 
might lie in their flexibility; however, upon closer inspection such appeal 
may be found rather hollow because we still have to justify the ethical 
standpoint that a particular writer takes on a particular situation.134 A more 
straightforward argument would be that counterparties to such insider 
dealing transactions are the victims as they suffer directly from a lack of 
market sensitive information.135  
In addition, one may further argue that insider dealing is wrong (or 
unfair) because other investors do not have equal access to inside 
information.136 This “equal access theory” could work in combination with 
other theories (e.g. fair dealing or property theory).137 The swing in public 
policy against insider dealing would greatly influence how we formulate and 
interpret the insider dealing rule, particularly in grey area cases like 
Chiarella.  
From a more practical point of view, how legislators and judges in each 
jurisdiction approach insider dealing transactions and construe the law 
certainly depends on statutory language. The US law makes strong reference 
to “fraud” because the US insider dealing rule comes from the anti-fraud 
provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.138 
In contrast, there is no use of the term “defraud” in UK law; the FSMA 
2000 puts insider dealing under the heading of “market abuse,” which gives 
clues on how to deal with “insider dealing.” The way the FSMA 2000 
determines the legal consequences of such kinds of market abuse (i.e. not 
avoiding a contract but imposing penalties or ordering restitution as 
remedies) suggests that the FSA focuses on the market as a whole rather than 
an individual corporation or counterparty. In addition, structuring insider 
dealing under “market abuse” has the advantage of avoiding the need to 
force all arguments into the mould of “fraud,” as in the US.139 
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In the end, we should be aware that the insider dealing rule was 
developed in securities regulations to regulate the securities market. If we 
move beyond the securities market, we may find similar concerns about 
price, unfairness, and even fraud in relation to potential insider dealing. 
However, there also exist certain difficulties, as we have to keep a balance 
between the common law non-disclosure rule and a more regulatory-style 
insider dealing rule. It is on this basis that we will continue our arguments. 
 
B. Application to the Risk Trading Market 
 
1. Securities-related Exchange Trading 
 
The concerns arising from insider dealing in the securities market might 
also be applied in the futures, options or other securities-related products 
traded on exchanges. Insider dealing by way of securities-related derivative 
instruments is already regulated in both the UK and the US.140 The case for 
securities-related options is simpler: an insider can make profits by 
arbitraging the fluctuation of the option prices or between the current 
securities prices and the future option exercise prices; he may also make 
profits or avoid immediate loss by using his inside information to buy or sell 
single-name securities futures contracts (e.g. futures contracts for British 
Petroleum stocks). 
However, making profits on the futures market is not as simple as 
buying and selling stocks or bonds in a securities exchange. Until the futures 
product matures, a trader does not really pay for the underlying assets (but 
only the margin). For example, if we borrow the facts from SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulfur Co.,141 the TGF had some good news on discovering a new oil 
field. Before announcing this new discovery in a clear way, some directors 
traded the company’s stocks on the market, and the directors were held to be 
responsible for insider dealing. If any one of these directors wanted to profit 
from futures trading using their inside information, he had to build up long 
futures positions and liquidate as soon as the information was published 
(assuming that the announcement of such information would have led to the 
rise of the TGF’s stock price). Since technically he did not hold any valuable 
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already included insider dealing by way of a securities-based swap agreement. See Securities 
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assets but only a contractual right to buy the underlying assets at the end of 
trading, we could hardly deem him to have made a profit unless the position 
is liquidated. This shows that a futures position is a contract that expires at a 
certain point of time in the future (by triggering the process of physical 
delivery or cash settlement). Moreover, we may also further compare the 
situation where the director does not buy company stocks but lands lying 
near the site of the new oil field. Should the directors disclose the 
information to the land owner (which would presumably increase the 
property prices)? In principle, the common law non-disclosure rule should 
apply (unless the court holds otherwise).142 
In addition, more difficulties arise if an insider trades indices futures 
(such as the FTSE 100 futures). In order to establish that the insider used his 
inside knowledge to earn a profit in the index futures market, we have to 
establish the connections between the sensitive information and not only the 
price of the securities but also the movement of the futures market. Since an 
index might be influenced by many factors other than information 
concerning a single company, the causal link between a piece of information 
and the index might become problematic. 
We should then consider why insider dealing by securities-related 
futures should be regulated as under current law. If the misappropriation 
theory is the basis, it probably does not matter much whether an insider 
trades in the spot market or in the securities-related futures market. After all, 
the insider is penalised because he misappropriates corporate information to 
gain his own profits for himself. Moral theories might also help to support 
this point. However, difficulties remain in determining the amount of 
damages or restitution to be attributed if an insider trades market index 
futures before a piece of material information is disclosed. 
On the other hand, if using inside information in the securities-related 
futures market is not desirable because it could be seen as a type of market 
abuse or is a fraud on the market, further research is needed to establish the 
link between information and the prices of a specific futures product in order 
to explain the potential negative impact on the market. After all, since the 
futures prices reflect expectations for the future, more has to be done to 
establish the future “price integrity” than in the spot securities market. 
 
2. Commodity Transactions 
 
(a) Some Problems 
 
If we expand our framework beyond securities, it will be seen that 
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scenarios similar to securities insider dealing may still occur in the 
commodities market. Something akin to the Bin Laden example we gave 
earlier could well occur in a big oil company, to the directors of such a 
company or any person receiving trading tips from these “insiders.” 
Information in the commodities market is as important as in the securities 
market. 
There are several situations where commodity insider dealing could 
occur. First, an insider could arbitrage price differences in the spot market, in 
the futures market, or between spot and futures market prices. By 
comparison with the securities market, it is more difficult to make a fortune 
by arbitraging in the spot commodity market. Higher liquidity in the market 
is the key to making such a scheme viable. It is obviously easier to conduct 
commodities insider dealing on organised exchanges where a person can 
buy, sell, and liquidate transactions quickly and at lower costs. However, 
with the help of standardised documentation in commodities trading, and to 
some extent the use of clearing clauses (such as circle clauses), a trader may 
still earn price differences by way of spot market commodity trades. In 
addition, if, using inside information, a person buys a commodity (e.g. gold) 
and keeps it as long-term investment rather than arbitraging price differences 
within a short period of time, it is arguable whether this is a kind of insider 
dealing that merits punishment. 
Secondly, insider dealing may occur if an insider uses inside 
information regarding the production of a commodity to make a profit.143 
For example, a leading agricultural company knows that the production of 
August crops will not be good this year. Before this production information 
is disclosed to the market, either the company itself or one of its directors 
uses this information to sell agriculture futures. In the securities market, the 
same scenario would constitute insider dealing.144 Likewise, big universal 
banks may acquire significant inside knowledge about the various aspects of 
their banking business and use the information for speculative trading.145 
Thirdly, one could use inside information for personal profit by taking a 
step ahead of a market participant’s transactions — this is sometimes called 
the problem of “front-running.” 146  Tips could range from the market 
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participant’s hedging strategies to a bulky spot (or futures) transaction and 
could influence market prices in a significant fashion. For example, knowing 
that part of the Shell strategy is to sell Brent futures positions in bulk, an 
insider might sell Brent futures before Shell does and buy back positions 
after Shell has sold its futures (assuming that Shell’s bulk trading would send 
futures prices down in the short term and no other factors were involved). 
Fourthly, a more serious problem would occur if one tried to make a 
profit by creating a significant market event, which is not a remote 
possibility in a globalised society, given that the market prices for some 
major commodities (such as crude oil and currencies) are greatly influenced 
not only by the law of supply and demand but also by major economic and 
political events. A powerful trader might also corner the market to fuel up 
spot or futures prices so that he could make profit on his own speculative 
positions.147 This does indeed enter the realm of market manipulation or 
market abuse rather than traders merely using their information to their own 
advantage. 
Fifthly, insider dealing may well occur across different sectors, not just 
in a single market. Some big market participants might have interests in 
different products or industries, such that they are in a powerful position to 
use information acquired in one market for trading in another market.148 For 
example, a particularly bad crop year in the US would affect not only 
domestic buyers and sellers but also foreign spot or futures markets, as 
merchants might seek supplies from somewhere outside the US. Prices of 
substitute raw materials could also rise if other traders turned to other 
alternatives. 
In addition, two markets can be inter-connected even though, 
superficially, they appear to be unrelated. For example, the corn futures 
market has become a playground for many energy traders because corn is 
increasingly being used to manufacture ethanol.149 The energy industry 
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might feel the heat if corn prices were driven too high, and prices for ethanol 
would be affected. A bad crop year might also send shockwaves through the 
freight market, as shipping from the US might diminish in the future and 
thus also affect freight rate forwards/swaps.150 In addition, a bad crop year 
would certainly influence the share prices of big agricultural companies (as 
well as the industry in general). This would again lead to the realm of insider 
dealing in securities. 
 
(b) Discussion 
 
We may analyse potential insider dealing issues in the commodities 
market in two dimensions: who uses the inside information and what are the 
purposes of using such inside information. 
First, from the above scenarios, we might find that potential insider 
dealing in the commodities market is not limited to corporate insiders or 
tippees who know something about the company that is not yet known to 
outsiders. There is a chance that it is the company itself using inside 
information rather than a corporate insider using the company’s information. 
This reflects the differences between the commodities market and the 
securities market. Normally, an issuer of securities would not buy and sell its 
own stocks or bonds circulated in the secondary market and, even if it did 
buy back its stocks, there are certain rules in company law or securities 
regulation that the issuing company has to follow.151 Buying back its own 
shares might also raise market manipulation concerns and allow regulators to 
intervene.152 Thus, in the securities market, usually we focus on insider 
dealing of corporate directors or other insiders. 
In contrast, in the commodities market, it is open to manufacturers, 
producers and any corporate or non-corporate insider to trade at the same 
time. Both the source of information and the insiders who have access to the 
information could conduct trading with this inside information. Where a 
director or any other inside personnel uses his inside knowledge to make 
personal profits, this is similar to insider dealing in securities; thus, we may 
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attempt to apply the same line of analysis developed in securities regulation. 
However, where it is the generator of information that enters into trading 
using his own inside knowledge, there are more conflicts between the 
common law non-disclosure rule and the idea of prohibiting insider dealing 
in the financial market as a whole. 
Secondly, the reasons for an insider dealing transaction might enter into 
the question. In the context of risk trading contracts, one person could make 
an insider dealing transaction for the purpose of hedging future losses as 
well as speculating on the market. If speculation is the sole purpose, this is 
more comparable to insider dealing in the securities market since it is closer 
to opportunistic behaviour that can be attacked on moral grounds. In 
contrast, since hedging is more or less established as a legitimate purpose,153 
it is arguable that there is nothing wrong with using unpublished material 
information to avoid one’s own loss, especially when it is the company, 
rather than a director or any other corporate insider, who uses the inside 
information in trading. 
We should also note that there is already a continuous duty of disclosure 
of material information to the market in securities regulation. Thus, it is 
natural to prohibit insiders from exploiting that information before it is 
published. In contrast, as regulation on commodities trading does not contain 
such a duty, why should we bother to ask people not to use his inside 
information if, in principle, they are allowed to take any information 
advantage? A balance must be made between the common law rule and the 
insider dealing rule imposed by statutes. The reasons why we perceive 
insider dealing as wrong will determine how important we find tackling 
insider dealing in the non-securities market. 
As in the securities market, there are two lines of analysis we may 
follow. On the one hand, we could follow the line of price integrity. 
However, we should be cautious when comparing futures prices with spot 
market prices as there is no doubt that a piece of information could influence 
both the physical market and the hedging market (Laidlaw v. Organ154 is a 
good example). However, a non-disclosure of inside information does not 
automatically mean that market prices are wrong.155 A coherent line of 
analysis has to be made to fully justify a wrongful price theory in relation to 
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commodity insider dealing.156 
On the other hand, if insider dealing is not wrong because of its market 
implications but because the insider uses a piece of information that does not 
belong to him, we should consider whether the problem could be resolved in 
other ways. In a more typical insider situation, the source of the information 
might use existing legal tools, such as fiduciary duties or confidentiality 
duties, to restrain directors, officers, employees or any contracted persons 
from using that information. Why should we launch a regulatory scheme to 
address the problem of corporate insiders using corporate information in the 
commodities market if the problem could be solved by inserting a 
contractual term to allow the company to sue for damages? 
Currently, the FSA takes a fine line in distinguishing insider dealing as 
market abuse and trading with legitimate business.157 The FSA has provided 
some guidelines on whether, in using inside information, a person is 
pursuing legitimate business. To quote in full: 
 
In the opinion of the FSA, the following factors are to be taken into 
account in determining whether or not a person’s behaviour is in 
pursuit of legitimate business, and are indications that it is:  
(1) the extent to which the relevant trading by the person is carried 
out in order to hedge a risk, and in particular the extent to which 
it neutralises and responds to a risk arising out of the person’s 
legitimate business; or  
(2) whether, in the case of a transaction on the basis of inside 
information about a client’s transaction which has been 
executed, the reason for it being inside information is that 
information about the transaction is not, or is not yet, required 
to be published under any relevant regulatory or exchange 
obligations; or  
(3) whether, if the relevant trading by that person is connected with 
a transaction entered into or to be entered into with a client 
(including a potential client), the trading either has no impact on 
the price or there has been adequate disclosure to that client that 
trading will take place and he has not objected to it; or  
(4) the extent to which the person’s behaviour was reasonable by 
the proper standards of conduct of the market concerned, taking 
into account any relevant regulatory or legal obligations and 
whether the transaction is executed in a way which takes into  
                                                                                                                            
 156. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 6, at 108-11. 
 157. FSA Handbook, MAR 1.3.7. For its text, available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/ 
handbook/MAR/1/3 (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 
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 account the need for the market as a whole to operate fairly and 
efficiently.158 
 
This explanation appears to show that the FSA is trying to reconcile the 
common law and the market abuse rule in order to define the line between 
lawful business practice and market abuse conduct. The FSA is ready to 
allow a true hedging contract to stand even if inside information was used to 
make the hedging transaction. Insider dealing in the commodities market 
might be allowed if it is in line with the standards of market conduct (and 
thus no market “abuse”) or has no impact on the market (and thus no abuse 
of the “market”). Apparently, the more organised the market, the more likely 
that the financial regulator will enforce the relevant market abuse rules. 
However, it remains to be seen how far the FSA would extend the use of the 
insider dealing rule to risk trading contracts that take place outside the 
banking circle or organised exchanges. If such contracts are not touched by 
regulation, they will be governed by the common law rule, where one party 
might in principle enjoy his information advantage. 
If a person intentionally stages an event to work market prices to his 
favour, this is probably more like market manipulation behaviour. To address 
this kind of conduct, a more comprehensive and focused market 
manipulation regulation might be better suited than a general prohibition on 
insider dealing. After all, market manipulation looks much more like straight 
fraud than mere non-disclosure. 
Moreover, there might be concerns over the integrity and openness of 
trading if major participants worked the exchange and rules to their favour. 
Through such participants’ superior knowledge of the market, one might 
wonder whether “outsiders” were being treated fairly in the open market.159 
In this case, major market participants’ use of their inside knowledge might 
be subject to further scrutiny.160 And one might further challenge the role an 
exchange could play in dealing with market manipulation or insider 
dealing. 161  In the off-exchange market, a further point might be the 
regulatory control (if any) of trade associations or non-profit organisations, 
which produce standard forms for the market.162 
                                                                                                                            
 158. FSA Handbook, MAR 1.3.10. For its text, available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/ 
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MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 58 (1986). If 
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 160. See FSA Handbook, MAR 1.3, particularly the example given in MAR 1.3.21. For the text, 
available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/1/3 (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 
 161. See AVGOULEAS, supra note 6, at 229-34. 
 162 . Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-making for the Financial Markets, 29 
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Lastly, certain insider dealing problems could be related to relationships 
among parties. For example, a front-running problem might occur where a 
broker trades for his own benefit before he trades for a client’s trading 
order.163 If we turn to the private law side of the issue, front-running in the 
context of the broker-client relationship might raise the issue of breaching 
fiduciary duty (provided that a fiduciary relationship is established in the 
first place). 
On the one hand, one argument to support a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim is based on the fact that a broker has to use information about his 
client’s order to make front-running transactions. Thus, it is arguable that a 
broker breaches his duty of confidentiality by front-running. In Brandeis 
Brokers Ltd. v. Black,164 Brandeis, the broker, was accused of breaching his 
fiduciary duty to Black, his client, by mis-pricing and front-running. The 
arbitral tribunal held that it is a “misuse of confidential information” if a 
“broker discloses to outside parties, or uses for its own purposes, 
confidential information in its possession about a client’s positions, 
transactions or intended transactions” and that “[f]ront-running would be a 
particular form of misuse of confidential information.”165 Toulson J upheld 
the arbitral decision. 
On the other hand, another argument is that a broker’s front-running 
moves market prices before his client’s order and thus puts his client in a less 
favourable place if a broker trades ahead of a bulky order. In an American 
case, Dial, the defendant, was accused of committing mail fraud in violation 
of a federal statute by trading ahead of a client’s trading order in the Chicago 
Board of Trade.166 The main issue was fraud rather than fiduciary duties. 
However, the Seventh Circuit Court also held that:  
 
Dial, when he solicited his customers to participate in block orders, 
implicitly represented to them that he would try to get the best 
possible price. He could have gotten a better price by putting their 
orders in ahead of the orders he placed for his own accounts and 
those of his friends. In trading ahead of his customers without 
telling them what he was doing, he was misleading them for his 
own profit, and conduct of this type has long been considered 
fraudulent.167 
                                                                                                                            
the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2006). 
 163. This kind of practice is already prohibited by the Financial Services Authority. FSA 
Handbook, MAR 1.3.2(2) and the example given in MAR 1.3.22. For its text, available at 
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 164. Brandeis Brokers Ltd. v. Black, [2001] 2 LLOYD’S REP. 359 (Q.B.).   
 165. Id. at 366. 
 166. US v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (1985). 
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In the end, Dial was held to have committed fraud. If we follow the 
above two judgments, it seems that it is accepted by both the UK and US 
court that a commodity futures broker breaches his duty of confidentiality or 
loyalty by front-running a client’s order. We may also find that 
misappropriation or fiduciary theory might become the basis for regulation 
against front-running by a commodity futures broker. 167 
 
3. Credit Market  
 
We now turn to potential insider dealing and OTC transactions, starting 
first with the credit market. To take an example, a person learns from the 
director of a big company that the company might suffer a major credit 
default. Subsequently, that person (as a risk seller) chooses to enter into a 
CDS with a bank to insure against the credit risks of that company. Soon 
after, the default does occur and the person may earn some monies even 
without owning the bonds of the company (subject to the terms of the CDS). 
Even for a true hedger, such a manoeuvre could still earn him a lower 
fixed-rate for the CDS since the CDS rate would rise to reflect the new credit 
exposure after a default. Inside information could influence the credit market 
in the same way that arbitraging securities prices does. 
Apart from the theories mentioned above, we could put forward two 
more arguments on the issue of potential insider dealing in the credit 
derivative market. On the one hand, perhaps what we dislike most is people 
behaving opportunistically in arbitraging information advantages. When one 
speculates on the credit market, one is actually trying to make a fortune from 
the misery of an issuer or a creditor. This kind of opportunistic conduct 
might easily invite negative remarks. 
On the other hand, to use an argument similar to those used in 
insurance, if a person takes advantage of his prior knowledge of certain 
credit issues of a third party and buys protection with a lower rate from a risk 
buyer, one could argue that he is not acting in good faith.168 Without 
additional help from regulators, we can only rely on the contract or common 
law doctrines such as fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. A duty of utmost 
good faith followed by a duty of disclosure might solve the problem; 
however, we have found no convincing reason to impose a duty of “utmost 
good faith” in our above analysis. The market abuse approach taken by the 
FSMA 2000 might be a more flexible way of dealing with this issue than the 
fraud theories developed in both securities regulation and commodities 
regulation in the US. Again, these issues might also be resolved through 
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contractual terms; thus, arguably there is no need for the law to intervene as 
a party can protect himself by negotiating better contractual terms. In this 
circumstance, issues relating to bargaining power and the party’s ability to 
negotiate terms to protect himself would come to the fore. 
Lastly, the credit market could be closely connected with the securities 
market. For a CDS, this partly depends on how wide a credit event is defined 
in each credit derivative instrument. For a credit total return swap,169 all the 
gains (including price appreciation) from the reference obligation (e.g. a 
corporate bond) are transferred from a risk seller to the risk buyer. If either 
party has inside knowledge about something that is bound to happen, they 
could actually make a profit through a total return swap, much like 
arbitraging in the securities market. The same might be argued for an equity 
swap.170 It is not easy to estimate the probability of success regarding such 
manoeuvres in practice. Unless the credit event happens very rapidly and the 
first settlement date is not far off, it might not be easy for such a scheme to 
succeed. But however likely it may be, we could still recognise that an 
insider has a chance to use the growing credit market to earn private profit. 
He is still using corporate information, but he is not necessarily creating 
wrongful market prices (with regard to those securities). This might provide 
further challenges to financial regulators when the credit market booms.171 
 
4. Other OTC Transactions 
 
In the end, we should consider the potential insider dealing problems 
raised by other cash-settled OTC derivative transactions. Given the variety 
of instruments and traders, it would be nearly impossible to exhaust the 
possibilities for using OTC instruments for purposes of insider dealing. For 
instance, it is not unthinkable that the major shareholder of a company might 
use its insider knowledge of the company’s operations to enter into an equity 
swap. A company might also make a profit from having contracts for 
differences or equity swap before announcing a plan to take over another 
company whose shares underlie the contract for differences or swap.172 
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 172. In 1995, Trafalgar House plc had a series of equity swaps (structured as contracts for 
differences) on certain regional electricity companies before announcing a takeover for one of the 
electricity companies. Trafalgar House plc was accused of insider dealing, but was cleared by the 
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There could be several motives for using inside information in OTC 
transactions. On the one hand, an insider might wish to take advantage of his 
information and make a deal at a lower price — such a situation is similar to 
Laidlaw v. Organ173 except that the information advantage is applied in a 
different type of trading. Whether an insider dealing transaction based on 
this motive is worth punishment as an abuse of market requires further 
clarification by judges and regulators. 
On the other hand, a person might use his information advantage to 
make a straight profit. The current FSA insider dealing rules broadly cover 
“dealing” in qualified investment related investment on the basis of inside 
information. In one of the examples given by the FSA, the FSA would regard 
a director’s spread bet on securities prices of a company as insider dealing if 
the director placed his bet on the basis of the belief that undisclosed news 
about the company’s imminent takeover would increase the value of his 
shares.174 If we follow this example, entering into a contract for differences 
(e.g. interest rate swap, spread bets etc.) on the basis of inside information 
might fall under the UK market abuse rule. 
Again, we could see the contrast between the application of the common 
law non-disclosure rule and the market abuse/insider dealing rule in the 
context of OTC trading. The common law rule is restrained by the scope of 
insider dealing regulation. In other words, trading OTC derivative 
instruments with inside information might not be wrong except when it is 
recognised as an instance of market abuse. 
 
5. Summary 
 
In this part, we have noted that insider dealing problems might arise in 
the risk trading market. The insider dealing rule has largely been developed 
in the securities market, so where securities are involved, there should not be 
a problem in applying the securities insider dealing rule. In contrast, what 
concerns us here is insider dealing in non-securities related markets. To this 
end, we have found that commodities futures prices are not directly 
comparable with spot market prices, and thus price integrity arguments 
might be a persuasive way of extending the securities insider dealing rule to 
the commodities market. On the other hand, we face the difficulty of 
reconciling the common law non-disclosure rule and the idea of insider 
dealing. This is a policy decision, and Parliament or financial regulators 
should have the final say on how far a trader may enjoy advantages deriving 
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from inside information. In addition, we also identified a source of potential 
problems in the credit market and noted that there might be some moral 
arguments against people speculating on other people’s credit. Lastly, where 
a person intentionally creates an event to work market prices to his favour, 
this is not merely insider dealing but a deceptive or manipulative scheme. 
Such kinds of behaviour might be called “fraud” and should be taken in hand 
by regulators, if not by courts through other common law options. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have explored issues of pre-contractual disclosure for 
derivative instruments. Risk trading contracts strongly rely on all sorts of 
information as they deal with future uncertainties. Indeed, for every 
transaction there is a certain degree of asymmetric information. The problem 
is how the law tips the balance in different contexts. Our approach is to see 
whether risk trading contracts could fit into existing categories that require 
disclosure rather than creating a general duty of disclosure. 
In common law, there is no general duty of disclosure before a contract 
is made. So a contractual party could take advantage of any information of 
which the counterparty is ignorant. However, this general rule is restricted 
by the law of deceit and misrepresentation: where any non-disclosure can 
constitute fraud or misrepresentation, the information holder has to disclose 
to avoid further liability. 
There also exist several exceptions to the general rule, and it is on these 
exceptions that we can draw a comparison with risk trading contracts. First, 
we have seen that mandatory disclosure in the securities market cannot be 
extended to exchange-traded futures contracts (save where securities are 
involved) because of the nature of securities. With regard to commodity 
futures, it is impractical to impose similar duties on those who produce the 
underlying commodities (cf. issuers of stocks). 
Secondly, there is also a duty of disclosure structured under a wider duty 
of utmost good faith for insurance contracts. However, we find this is less 
successful in risk trading contracts. On the one hand, it lacks a uniform 
definition of hedging, speculative or derivative instruments, such that any 
general duty could have a wider and more profound impact than intended. 
On the other hand, non-insurance risk trading contracts lack the inequality of 
knowledge issue underlying contracts of insurance. While the duty of good 
faith could play a role in filling the gap between fraud and the common law 
non-disclosure rule in insurance, we cannot draw the same comparison for 
most risk trading contracts. This is not to say that there could be no moral 
hazard issues in the derivative market. However, since the current market is 
still limited to transactions between sophisticated market participants, it is 
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less an issue because parties can address the problem in their contracts. 
Further problems may evolve in the future, should modern hedging or 
speculative contracts become more consumerised. 
Thirdly, we have found that the prohibition of insider dealing has some 
impact on the issue of pre-contractual disclosure. The insider dealing rule 
does not really require traders to disclose information but prohibits them 
from using it. The insider dealing rule has already been the subject of various 
discussions and the underpinning theories of why insider dealing is wrong 
can determine how far we should go to deal with this problem. On the one 
hand, we have to be careful when drawing comparison between futures and 
spot prices. It is also hard to provide a comprehensive theory to distinguish 
the general rule of non-disclosure (as in Laidlaw v. Organ) from the insider 
dealing rule in securities regulation. On the other hand, we could also argue 
from a moral perspective against speculating on another person’s 
information. The overarching concepts of “market abuse” or “market fraud” 
might provide a better basis for addressing information issues in the risk 
trading market. Nevertheless, there remains much to research before 
reaching a more complete conclusion.  
Ultimately, our question is: where does one draw the line between a 
more lenient common law approach and additional regulatory disclosure 
rules regarding information problems in risk trading contracts? This might 
be a question that legislators and regulators have to consider in the future. 
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